Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting
  Protocols by Lindner, Claudia & Rothe, Joerg
ar
X
iv
:0
90
2.
06
20
v5
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
9 O
ct 
20
09
Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded
Cake-Cutting Protocols∗
Claudia Lindner and Jo¨rg Rothe
Institut fu¨r Informatik
Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf
40225 Du¨sseldorf, Germany
October 19, 2009
Abstract
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a “cake” (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the
resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a
“fair” amount of the cake. An important notion of fairness is envy-freeness: No player wishes
to switch the portion of the cake received with another player’s portion. Despite intense efforts
in the past, it is still an open question whether there is a finite bounded envy-free cake-cutting
protocol for an arbitrary number of players, and even for four players.
We introduce the notion of degree of guaranteed envy-freeness (DGEF) as a measure of
how good a cake-cutting protocol can approximate the ideal of envy-freeness while keeping
the protocol finite bounded (trading being disregarded). We propose a new finite bounded
proportional protocol for any number n ≥ 3 of players, and show that this protocol has a
DGEF of 1+
⌈
n2/2
⌉
. This is the currently best DGEF among known finite bounded cake-cutting
protocols for an arbitrary number of players. We will make the case that improving the DGEF
even further is a tough challenge, and determine, for comparison, the DGEF of selected known
finite bounded cake-cutting protocols.
1 Introduction
Fair allocation of goods or resources among various agents is a central task in multiagent systems
and other fields. The specific setting where just one divisible resource is to be divided fairly is
commonly referred to as cake-cutting, and agents are called players in this setting. Research in the
area of cake-cutting started off in the 1940s with the pioneering work of Steinhaus [Ste48] who,
to the best of our knowledge, was the first to introduce the problem of fair division. Dividing a
∗Supported in part by the DFG under grants RO 1202/12-1 (within the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES
program LogICCC: “Computational Foundations of Social Choice”) and RO 1202/11-1 and by the Alexander von
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1
good (or a resource) fairly among several players such that each of them is satisfied with the portion
received is of central importance in many fields. In the last 60 years this research area has developed
vividly, spreading out into various directions and with applications in areas as diverse as economics,
mathematics, computer science, and psychology. While some lines of this research seek to find
reasonable interpretations of what “fairness” really stands for and how to measure it [Fol67, FK74,
Cha86], others are concerned more with proofs of existence or impossibility theorems regarding fair
division [Var74, Wel85, Aki95], or with the development of new cake-cutting procedures [BT95,
Str80, RW98, BB04] and, relatedly, with the analysis of their complexity relative to both upper
and lower bounds [MIBK03, WS07, Pro09]. Since cake-cutting procedures involve several parties
(namely, the players), they are also referred to as “protocols.”
Cake-cutting protocols aim at achieving a fair division of an infinitely divisible resource among
n players, who each may have different preferences for (and thus different valuations of) different
parts of the resource. In this paper, we focus on (a notion of) fairness in finite bounded cake-
cutting protocols. Many cake-cutting protocols are known today, both finite and continuous ones.
While a finite protocol always provides a solution after only a finite number of decisions have been
made, a continuous protocol could potentially run forever. Among finite protocols, one can further
distinguish between bounded and unbounded ones. A finite bounded cake-cutting protocol is present
if we know in advance that a certain number of steps (that may depend on the number of players)
will suffice to divide the resource fairly—independently of how the players may value distinct parts
of the resource in a particular case and independently of the strategies chosen by the players. In
contrast, in finite unbounded cake-cutting protocols, we cannot predict an upper bound on how
many steps will be required to achieve the same goal. Aiming to apply cake-cutting procedures to
real-world scenarios, it is important to develop fair finite bounded cake-cutting protocols. In this
context, “fairness” is often interpreted as meaning “envy-freeness.” A division is envy-free if no
player has an incentive to switch his or her portion with the portion any other player received.
Steinhaus [Ste49] proved that for any number of players an envy-free division of a single
divisible good always exists. However, the current state of the art—after six decades of intense
research—is that for arbitrary n, and even for n = 4, the development of finite bounded envy-free
cake-cutting protocols still appears to be out of reach, and a big challenge for future research. For
n > 3 players, hardly any envy-free cake-cutting protocol is known, and the ones that are known
are either finite unbounded or continuous (see, e.g., [BT95, RW97, BTZ97]). Though, from an
implementation perspective, finite bounded protocols are the ones that are most desirable. Recently,
Stromquist [Str07] has shown that for more than two players there is no finite cake-cutting protocol
that provides an envy-free division when all portions are required to consist of contiguous pieces.
Our goal in this paper is to look for compromises that can be made with respect to envy-freeness
while keeping the protocol finite bounded: We propose an approach to evaluate finite bounded (yet
possibly non-envy-free) cake-cutting protocols with respect to their “degree of guaranteed envy-
freeness” (DGEF). Informally put, this notion provides a measure of how good such a protocol can
approximate the (possibly for this particular protocol unreachable) ideal of envy-freeness in terms
of the number of envy-free-relations that are guaranteed to exist even in the worst case.
This paper is organized as follows. After defining some basic notions in Section 2, we introduce
the notion of degree of guaranteed envy-freeness, and specify the DGEF for some well-known
finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocols in Section 3. In Section 4 we present a new
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finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol with an enhanced degree of guaranteed envy-
freeness, compared with the proportional protocols mentioned in Section 3. This new cake-cutting
protocol makes use of parallelization in order to include as many matching valuations (in terms of
not raising envy) as possible. Section 5 briefly describes those protocols mentioned in Section 3,
and determines their degree of guaranteed envy-freeness via a detailed analysis. In Section 6,
we compare the DGEF approach with related work, and show that even small steps toward the
development of cake-cutting protocols with an enhanced DGEF are of significance. Finally, we
conclude in Section 7 that our approach extends the scope for the development of new finite bounded
cake-cutting protocols by “approximating” envy-freeness instead of insisting on it.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
Cake-cutting is about dividing a cake into portions that are assigned to the players such that each
of them feels, according to his or her individual valuation of the portions, to have received a fair
amount of the cake.1 The cake is assumed to be infinitely divisible, and can be divided into arbitrary
pieces without losing any of its value. Moreover, we assume the cake to be heterogeneous.2 This
assumption can be made without loss of generality, as any cake-cutting protocol providing a “fair”
division of a heterogeneous resource can be applied in the same way to a homogeneous one [BT96].
Given n players, cake C is to be divided into n portions that are to be distributed among the players
so as to satisfy each of them. A portion is not necessarily a single piece of cake but rather can
be a collection of disjoint, possibly noncontiguous pieces of C. Furthermore, all players may have
different individual valuations of the single pieces of the cake. For example, one player may prefer
the pieces with the chocolate topping, whereas another player may prefer the pieces with the cherry
topping.
More formally, cake C is represented by the unit interval [0,1] of real numbers. By performing
cuts, C is divided into m pieces ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ m: Each player pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, assigns value vi(ck) =
vi(xk,yk) to piece ck ⊆C, where ck is represented by the subinterval [xk,yk]⊆ [0,1] and pi’s valuation
function vi maps subintervals of [0,1] to real numbers in [0,1]. We require each valuation function
vi to satisfy the following properties:
1. Normalization: vi(0,1) = 1.
2. Positivity:3 For all ck ⊆C, ck 6= /0, we have vi(ck)> 0.
3. Additivity: For all ck,cℓ ⊆C, ck ∩ cℓ = /0, we have vi(ck)+ vi(cℓ) = vi(ck ∪ cℓ).
1As is common, “cake” will be used as a metaphor for the resource or the good to be divided.
2Consider, for example, a cake with cherry, chocolate, and strawberry toppings. A player may value, say, the pieces
with strawberry toppings higher than those with cherry toppings.
3The literature is a bit ambiguous regarding this assumption. Some papers require the players’ values for nonempty
pieces of cake to be nonnegative (i.e., vi(ck) ≥ 0) instead of positive. For example, Robertson and Webb [RW98] and
Woeginger and Sgall [WS07] require nonnegative values for nonempty pieces of cake, whereas positive values for such
pieces are required by Brams and Taylor [BT96], Brams, Jones, and Klamler [BJK07], and Weller [Wel85].
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4. Divisibility:4 For all ck ⊆C and for each α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, there exists some cℓ ⊆ ck such that
vi(cℓ) = α · vi(ck).
Note that, to simplify notation, we write vi(xk,yk) instead of vi([xk,yk]) for intervals [xk,yk]⊆ [0,1].
Due to Footnote 4, no ambiguity can arise. For each [x,y] ⊆ [0,1], define ‖[x,y]‖ = y− x. For any
real number x, ⌊x⌋ denotes the greatest integer not exceeding x, and ⌈x⌉ denotes the least integer not
smaller than x.
The assumption that C is heterogeneous formally means that subintervals of [0,1] having equal
size can be valued differently by the same player. Moreover, distinct players may value one and
the same piece of the cake differently, i.e., their individual valuation functions will in general be
distinct. Every player knows only the value of (arbitrary) pieces of C corresponding to his or her
own valuation function. Players do not have any knowledge about the valuation functions of other
players.
A division of C is an assignment of disjoint and nonempty portions Ci ⊆C, where C =⋃ni=1Ci =⋃m
k=1 ck, to the players such that each player pi receives a portion Ci ⊆C consisting of at least one
nonempty piece ck ⊆C. The goal of a cake-cutting division is to assign the portions to the players
in as fair a way as possible. There are different interpretations, though, of what “fair” might mean.
To distinguish between different degrees of fairness, the following notions have been introduced in
the literature (see, e.g., Robertson and Webb [RW98]):
Definition 2.1 Let v1,v2, . . . ,vn be the valuation functions of the n players. A division of cake
C =
⋃n
i=1Ci, where Ci is the ith player’s portion, is said to be:
1. simple fair (a.k.a. proportional) if and only if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have vi(Ci)≥ 1/n;
2. strong fair if and only if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have vi(Ci)> 1/n;
3. envy-free if and only if for each i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, we have vi(Ci)≥ vi(C j).
A cake-cutting protocol describes an interactive procedure for obtaining a division of a given
cake, without having any information on the valuation functions of the players involved. Each
protocol is characterized by a set of rules and a set of strategies (see, e.g., Brams and Taylor [BT96]).
The rules just determine the course of action, such as a request to cut the cake, whereas the strategies
define how to achieve a certain degree of fairness, e.g., by advising the players where to cut the cake.
If all players obey the protocol, it is guaranteed that every player receives a “fair” portion of the
cake. Cake-cutting protocols are characterized according to the degree of fairness of the divisions
obtained:5
Definition 2.2 A cake-cutting protocol is said to be simple fair (or proportional), strong fair, and
envy-free, respectively, if every division obtained (i.e., regardless of which valuation functions the
players have) is simple fair (or proportional), strong fair, and envy-free, respectively, provided that
all players follow the rules and strategies of the protocol.
4Divisibility implies that for each x ∈ [0,1], vi(x,x) = 0. That is, isolated points are valued 0, and open intervals have
the same value as the corresponding closed intervals.
5In addition to the fairness criteria given here, other fairness criteria may be reasonable as well and have been proposed
in the literature (see, e.g., Robertson and Webb [RW98]).
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Apparently, every division obtained by either a strong fair cake-cutting protocol or by an envy-
free cake-cutting protocol is simple fair as well (i.e., every strong fair or envy-free cake-cutting
protocol can be classified as being simple fair, too). Moreover, every simple fair cake-cutting
protocol can easily be applied to the case when there are unequal shares to be assigned, though
with respect to rational ratios only. Informally speaking, this can be done by cloning players and
their valuation functions so as to have in total as many players as the smallest common denominator
specifies (see, e.g., [RW98]).
3 Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness for Proportional Protocols
As mentioned in the introduction, the design of envy-free cake-cutting protocols for any number n of
players seems to be quite a challenge. For n ≤ 3 players, a number of protocols that always provide
envy-free divisions have been published, both finite (bounded and unbounded) and continuous
ones [Str80, BT96, RW98, BB04]. However, to the best of our knowledge, up to date no finite
bounded cake-cutting protocol for n > 3 players is known to always provide an envy-free division.
For practical purposes, it would be most desirable to have finite bounded cake-cutting protocols that
always provide divisions as fair as possible. In this regard, it is questionable whether the advantage
of always having an envy-free rather than just a proportional division would be big enough to justify
the lack of finite boundedness. It may be worthwhile to be content with a certain lower degree of
envy-freeness, rather than insisting on complete envy-freeness, for the benefit of having a finite
bounded protocol in exchange.
In this paper, we propose an approach that weakens the concept of envy-freeness for the purpose
of keeping protocols finite bounded. On the one hand, in Section 3.2 we are concerned with known
simple fair (i.e., proportional) cake-cutting protocols that are finite bounded, and determine their
degree of guaranteed envy-freeness, a notion to be introduced in Section 3.1 (see Definition 3.2).
On the other hand, in Section 4 we propose a new finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol
that—compared with the known protocols—has an enhanced degree of guaranteed envy-freeness.
3.1 Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness
When investigating the degree of envy-freeness of a cake-cutting protocol for n players, for each
player pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the value of his or her portion needs to be compared to the values of the n−1
other portions (according to the measure of player pi).6 Thus, n(n− 1) pairwise relations need to
be investigated in order to determine the degree of envy-freeness of a cake-cutting protocol for n
players. A player pi envies another player p j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j, when pi prefers player p j’s portion
to his or her own. If pi envies p j, we call the relation from pi to p j an envy-relation; otherwise, we
call it an envy-free-relation.
Definition 3.1 Consider a division of cake C =
⋃n
i=1Ci for a set P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of players,
where vi is pi’s valuation function and Ci is pi’s portion.
1. An envy-relation for this division (denoted by ) is a binary relation on P. Player pi envies
6We will use “valuation” and “measure” interchangeably.
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player p j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j, if and only if vi(Ci)< vi(C j). We write pi  p j.
2. An envy-free-relation for this division (denoted by 1) is a binary relation on P. Player pi does
not envy player p j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j, if and only if vi(Ci)≥ vi(C j). We write pi 1 p j.
The following properties of envy-relations and envy-free-relations are worth mentioning.7 No
player can envy him- or herself, i.e., envy-relations are irreflexive: The inequality vi(Ci) < vi(Ci)
never holds. Thus, we trivially have that vi(Ci) ≥ vi(Ci) always holds. However, when counting
envy-free-relations for a given division, we will disregard these trivial envy-free-relations pi 1 pi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, throughout the paper.
Furthermore, neither envy-relations nor envy-free-relations need to be transitive. This is due
to the fact that each player values every piece of the cake according to his or her own valuation
function. The valuation functions of different players will be distinct in general. For example, given
three distinct players pi, p j, and pk with valuations vi(Ci) < vi(C j) and v j(C j) < v j(Ck), we have
that pi  p j and p j  pk. However, these valuations do not provide any information about player
pi’s valuation of portion Ck, so we cannot conclude that pi  pk. An analogous argument applies to
envy-free-relations.
The above observations imply that envy-relations and envy-free-relations are either one-way or
two-way, i.e., it is possible that:
1. two players envy each other (pi  p j and p j  pi), which we refer to as “two-way envy,”
2. neither of two players envies the other (pi 1 p j and p j 1 pi), which we refer to as “two-way
envy-freeness,” and
3. one player envies another player but is not envied by this other player (pi  p j and p j 1 pi),
which we refer to as both “one-way envy” (from pi to p j) and “one-way envy-freeness” (from
p j to pi).
Assuming that all players are following the rules and strategies, some cake-cutting protocols
always guarantee an envy-free division (i.e., they always find an envy-free division of the cake),
whereas others do not. Only protocols that guarantee an envy-free division in every case, even
in the worst case (in terms of the players’ valuation functions), are considered to be envy-free.
Note that an envy-free division may be obtained by coincidence, just because the players have
matching valuation functions that avoid envy, and not because envy-freeness is enforced by the
rules and strategies of the cake-cutting protocol used. In the worst case, however, when the players
have totally nonconforming valuation functions, an envy-free division would not just happen by
7Various analogs of envy-relations and envy-free-relations have also been studied, from an economic perspective,
in the different context of multiagent allocation of indivisible resources. In particular, Feldman and Weiman [FW79]
consider “non-envy relations” (which are similar to our notion of envy-free-relations) and mention that these are not
necessarily transitive. Chauduri [Cha85] introduces “envy-relations” and mentions that these are irreflexive and not
necessarily transitive. Despite some similarities, their notions differ from ours, both in their properties and in the way
properties holding for their and our notions are proven. For example, Chauduri [Cha85] notes that mutual envy cannot
occur in a market equilibrium, i.e., in this case his “envy-relations” are asymmetric, which is in sharp contrast to two-way
envy being allowed for our notion.
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coincidence, but needs to be enforced by the rules and strategies of the protocol. An envy-free-
relation is said to be guaranteed if it exists even in the worst case.
We now define the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness in relation to the problem of cake-cutting.
Definition 3.2 For n ≥ 1 players, the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness (DGEF, for short) of
a given proportional8 cake-cutting protocol is defined to be the maximum number of envy-free-
relations that exist in every division obtained by this protocol (provided that all players follow the
rules and strategies of the protocol), i.e., the DGEF (which is expressed as a function of n) is the
number of envy-free-relations that can be guaranteed even in the worst case.
By a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes speak of the number of guaranteed envy-
free-relations (rather than of the guaranteed number of envy-free-relations). When we do so, let us
remind the reader that what matters is the total number of envy-free-relations that exist in the worst
case, and not the identification of specific envy-free-relations. Moreover, for technical reasons (see
the proof of Lemma 5.5), we also consider the case that there is only one player (i.e., n = 1). Note,
however, that in this case the DGEF of any cake-cutting protocol is trivially zero, since we disregard
the trivial envy-free-relation p1 1 p1.
Definition 3.2 is based on the idea of weakening the notion of fairness in terms of envy-freeness
in order to obtain cake-cutting protocols that are fair (though perhaps non-envy-free) and finite
bounded, where the fairness level of a protocol is given by its degree of guaranteed envy-freeness.
The higher the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness the fairer the protocol.
3.2 Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Proportional Cake-Cutting Protocols
We now give an upper and a lower bound on the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness for proportional
cake-cutting protocols. For comparison, note that Feldman and Kirman [FK74] observed that, for
any division, the number of envy-relations is always between zero and n(n−1); zero if everyone is
happy with his or her share of the cake, and n(n−1) if everyone is envious of everyone else.
Proposition 3.3 Let d(n) be the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of a proportional cake-cutting
protocol for n ≥ 2 players. It holds that n ≤ d(n)≤ n(n−1).
Proof. If n = 2 then we obviously have d(2) = 2, and this will be the case exactly if both players
value their share of the cake as being at least 1/2. Note that this case, n = 2 = d(n), reflects the fact
that every proportional protocol for two players is envy-free.
So, we now assume that n ≥ 3. As stated above, we disregard the trivial envy-free-relation
pi 1 pi for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consequently, each player can have at most n−1 envy-free-relations,
one to each of the other players, which gives a total of at most n(n − 1) guaranteed envy-free-
relations. This proves the upper bound: d(n)≤ n(n−1).
To prove the lower bound, note that, by definition, in a proportional division every player pi, 1≤
i≤ n, regards his or her portion being of value at least 1/n, i.e., vi(Ci)≥ 1/n. Thus, vi(C−Ci)≤ (n−1)/n
8The DGEF should be restricted to proportional protocols only, since otherwise the DGEF may overstate the actual
level of fairness, e.g., if all the cake is given to a single player.
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for each i. We will now prove that this implies that none of the players can envy each of the n− 1
other players at the same time. We show this for player p1; the argument is analogous for the other
players. So, assume that p1 envies some other player, say p2. Thus v1(C2)> v1(C1)≥ 1/n. It follows
that p1 values the remaining cake (C−C1)−C2 as being less than (n−2)/n, i.e., v1((C−C1)−C2)<
(n−2)/n. Consequently, there is no way to divide the remaining cake (C−C1)−C2 into n−2 portions
C3,C4, . . . ,Cn such that for each i, 3 ≤ i ≤ n, we have v1(Ci)≥ 1/n. Hence, there must be at least one
player p j, 3 ≤ j ≤ n, such that v1(C j) < 1/n ≤ v1(C1), so p1 1 p j. Considering all n players, this
gives at least n guaranteed envy-free-relations for a proportional protocol, so d(n) ≥ n. ❑
The degree of fairness of a division obtained by applying a proportional cake-cutting protocol
highly depends on the rules of this protocol. Specifying and committing to appropriate rules often
increases the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness, whereas the lack of such rules jeopardizes it in the
sense that the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations may be limited to the worst-case minimum
of n as stated in Proposition 3.3. In this context, “appropriate rules” are those that involve the
players’ evaluations of other players’ portions and of pieces that still are to be assigned. Concerning
a particular piece of cake, involving the evaluations of as many players as possible in the allocation
process helps to keep the number of envy-relations to be created low, since this allows to determine
early on whether a planned allocation may later turn out to be disadvantageous—and thus allows to
take adequate countermeasures. In contrast, omitting mutual evaluations means to forego additional
knowledge that could turn out to be most valuable later on.
For example, say player pi is going to get assigned piece c j. If the protocol asks all other players
to evaluate piece c j according to their measures, all envy-relations to be created by the assignment
of piece c j to player pi can be identified before the actual assignment and thus countermeasures
(such as trimming piece c j) can be undertaken. However, if the protocol requires no evaluations on
behalf of the other players, such envy-relations cannot be identified early enough to prevent them
from happening.
Lemma 3.4 Let a proportional cake-cutting protocol for n ≥ 2 players be given. If the rules of the
protocol require none of the players to value any of the other players’ portions, then the degree of
guaranteed envy-freeness is n (i.e., each player is guaranteed only one envy-free-relation).
Proof. Having a certain number of guaranteed envy-free-relations means to have at least this
number in any case, even in the worst case. For n = 2, proportionality implies envy-freeness, so the
worst case is the best case. For n ≥ 3 players, consider the following scenario. Given a division of
cake C =
⋃n
i=1Ci, without any restrictions other than aiming at a proportional division (i.e., the rules
of the protocol require none of the players to value any of the other players’ portions), we set the
valuation functions of the players as follows. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, player pi values portion Ci to be
worth exactly n/n2 = 1/n, pi values exactly one portion C j, i 6= j, to be worth exactly 2/n2 < 1/n, and
pi values each of the n−2 remaining portions Ck, ‖{i, j,k}‖ = 3, to be worth exactly (n+1)/n2 > 1/n.
These valuations make this division proportional, as every player values his or her portion to be
worth exactly 1/n. Moreover, each player has n− 2 envy-relations and just one guaranteed envy-
free-relation, the latter of which is due to Proposition 3.3. Hence, if the rules of the protocol require
none of the players to value any of the other players’ portions, then no more than n envy-free-
relations can be guaranteed by the given proportional cake-cutting protocol in the worst case. ❑
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The argument in the proof of Lemma 3.4 will be used to prove the upper bounds on the
DGEF of the proportional cake-cutting protocols considered in Theorem 3.5 (see also Lemmas 5.1
through 5.6) and Theorems 4.2 and 4.9.
An envy-free cake-cutting protocol for n players guarantees that no player pi envies any other
player p j, i.e., vi(Ci) ≥ vi(C j) for all i, j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, in each division C = ⋃ni=1Ci obtained
by this protocol. This is the case exactly if the protocol meets the upper bound on the degree of
guaranteed envy-freeness given in Proposition 3.3. That is, a cake-cutting protocol for n≥ 2 players
is envy-free (or completely fair) exactly if the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness equals n(n−1).
Our next result shows the DGEF for a number of well-known finite bounded proportional cake-
cutting protocols.9 For the sake of self-containment, these protocols will be described in Section 5.
Theorem 3.5 For n ≥ 3 players,10 the proportional cake-cutting protocols listed in Table 1 have a
degree of guaranteed envy-freeness as shown in the same table.
The proof of Theorem 3.5 can be found in Section 5. In particular, the proofs of Lemmas 5.1
through 5.6 provide the details of the analysis yielding the values in the DGEF column of Table 1.
Protocol DGEF Established via
Last Diminisher [Ste48] 2+ n(n−1)/2 Lemma 5.1
Lone Chooser [Fin64] n Lemma 5.2
Lone Divider [Kuh67] 2n−2 Lemma 5.3
Cut Your Own Piece (no strategy) [Ste69] n Lemma 5.4
Cut Your Own Piece (left-right strategy) 2n−2 Lemma 5.4
Divide and Conquer [EP84] n · ⌊logn⌋+2n−2⌊log n⌋+1 Lemma 5.5
Minimal-Envy Divide and Conquer [BJK07] n · ⌊logn⌋+2n−2⌊log n⌋+1 Lemma 5.5
Recursive Divide and Choose [Tas03] n Lemma 5.6
Table 1: DGEF of selected finite bounded cake-cutting protocols.
Apparently, the degrees of guaranteed envy-freeness of the protocols listed in Table 1 vary
considerably. Although each of the protocols may provide an envy-free division in the best case,
in the worst case some of them show just the minimum number of guaranteed envy-free-relations
according to Proposition 3.3, while others possess a significantly higher degree of guaranteed envy-
freeness. These differences can be explained by the fact that these protocols have been developed
with a focus on achieving proportionality, and not on maximizing the degree of guaranteed envy-
freeness. However, this indicates a new direction for future research, namely to increase the number
of guaranteed envy-free-relations while ensuring finite boundedness. In the next section, we take a
first step in this direction.
9These protocols may also be known under different names.
10The trivial cases n = 1 (where one player receives all the cake) and n = 2 (where each proportional division is
always envy-free) are ignored. Specifically, an envy-free (and thus proportional) division for n = 2 players can always
be obtained by applying the cut-and-choose protocol: One player cuts the cake into two pieces both of which he or she
considers to be worth exactly one half of the cake, and the other player chooses the piece that he or she considers to be
worth at least half of the cake.
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4 Enhancing the Degree of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness
In this section, we introduce a finite bounded cake-cutting protocol that, compared with the
protocols in Table 1, improves upon the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness. We will prove that
this protocol is proportional and strategy-proof, and that it can be adapted so as to even provide a
strong fair division. To present the protocol and its properties in an accessible way, we first handle
the case of n = 4 players separately in Section 4.1, before presenting and analyzing it for arbitrary
n ≥ 3 in Section 4.2.
4.1 A Proportional Protocol with an Enhanced DGEF for Four Players
Figure 1 gives a finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol for four players. We give both
the rules and the strategies at once. Note that the players have to follow the rules and strategies in
order to obtain a proportional share of the cake in any case.
The protocol in Figure 1 always provides a proportional division (see Theorem 4.1) and has
ten guaranteed envy-free-relations (see Theorem 4.2). To allow comparison for four players, the
best DGEF of any of the proportional protocols listed in Table 1 (see also Section 5)—namely,
that of both the Divide and Conquer protocols and the Last Diminisher protocol—is eight. Note
that a maximum number of twelve guaranteed envy-free-relations is possible for four players (and
this would give envy-freeness). Moreover, the protocol can be proven to be strategy-proof (see
Theorem 4.4), and to even yield a strong fair division, provided that exactly one player makes a
mark in Step 1 of the protocol that is closest to 1 (see Theorem 4.5).
Steps 4 through 12 of the protocol in Figure 1 (which is the part of the protocol when there
are just three players left) is simply the Selfridge–Conway protocol.11 We explicitly describe the
Selfridge–Conway protocol here for the sake of self-containment. Note that the Selfridge–Conway
protocol is also part of the more involved protocol for an arbitrary number of players, which will be
presented as Figure 3 in Section 4.2.
Theorem 4.1 The cake-cutting protocol in Figure 1 is proportional.
Proof. Since all three players entering Step 4 consider the portion of the fourth player (who
dropped out in Step 3) as being worth no more than 1/4, the Selfridge–Conway protocol is applied
to a part of the cake that all three involved players consider as being worth at least 3/4. Thus, since
the Selfridge–Conway protocol is an envy-free (hence, in particular, a proportional) protocol, it by
definition guarantees each of the three players entering Step 4 a portion of value at least 1/4 according
to their measures. Moreover, the player who dropped out in Step 3 considers his or her portion to
be worth 1/4 due to Step 1. Therefore, the cake-cutting protocol in Figure 1 always provides a
proportional division for n = 4 players. ❑
Theorem 4.2 The cake-cutting protocol in Figure 1 has ten guaranteed envy-free-relations.
11The Selfridge–Conway protocol is known to be a finite bounded envy-free cake-cutting protocol for n = 3 players
(see Stromquist [Str80] and also, e.g., [BT95, BT96, RW98]).
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Input: Cake C, and four players p1, p2, p3, p4, where pi has the valuation function vi.
Note that the value of cake C is normalized such that vi(C) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
Output: Mapping of portions Ci to players pi, where C =
⋃4
i=1Ci.
Step 1. Let each player pi, 1≤ i≤ 4, make a mark at mi ∈C, such that vi(mi,1) = 1/4.
Step 2. Find any player p j such that there is no player pk, 1 ≤ j,k ≤ 4, j 6= k, with
‖[mk,1]‖< ‖[m j,1]‖. (Ties can be broken arbitrarily.)
Step 3. Assign portion C j = [m j,1] to player p j and let p j drop out.
Denote the remaining players by p1, p2, and p3, without loss of generality, and let vi be
pi’s valuation function.
Step 4. Let player p1 cut [0,m j] into three pieces, say cx, cy, and cz, of equal value
according to v1.
Step 5. If v2(cx)> v2(cy) and v2(cx) > v2(cz), {x,y,z} = {1,2,3}, let player p2 trim
piece cx into piece c′x and trimmings R such that v2(c′x) = v2(cy) ≥ v2(cz) or
v2(c
′
x) = v2(cz) ≥ v2(cy). If there already exists a two-way tie for the most
valuable piece according to v2, do nothing.
Step 6. Let player p3 choose one of the three pieces cx (respectively, c′x if cx has been
trimmed), cy, or cz that is most valuable according to v3.
Step 7. Let player p2 choose one piece from the two remaining pieces that is most
valuable according to v2. If c′x is among the remaining pieces, player p2 has
to choose this one.
Step 8. Assign the remaining piece to player p1.
If trimmings have been made in Step 5, continue with Step 9, otherwise finished.
Step 9. Either player p2 or player p3 received the trimmed piece c′x. From these two,
let the player not having received c′x cut R into three equal pieces according
to his or her measure.
Step 10. Let the player having received c′x choose one of these three pieces that is most
valuable according to his or her measure.
Step 11. Let player p1 choose one out of the two remaining pieces that is most valuable
according to v1.
Step 12. Assign the remaining piece to the player that cut R.
Figure 1: A finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol with DGEF of 10 for four players.
Proof. The DGEF of the protocol in Figure 1 can be justified analogously to the arguments in
the proof of Theorem 4.1. Because the Selfridge–Conway protocol always provides an envy-free
division, there is no envy between the three players entering Step 4, which results in six guaranteed
envy-free-relations. In addition, the same three players will not envy the player (call him or her p j)
who dropped out in Step 3 with portion C j, since none of them valued portion C j as being worth
more than 1/4 and each of them is guaranteed a share of at least (1/3)(3/4) = 1/4, which gives three
more guaranteed envy-free-relations. Simply put, none of the three players entering Step 4 will envy
any of the three other players, summing up to nine guaranteed envy-free-relations. By the argument
in the proof of Proposition 3.3, no more envy-free-relations can be guaranteed on behalf of these
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three players. The last guaranteed envy-free-relation is due to player p j: Since the protocol always
provides a proportional division, p j cannot envy each of the three remaining players (again by the
proof of Proposition 3.3). However, it cannot be guaranteed that p j does not envy any of the other
two remaining players either, since p j does not evaluate their portions. This follows from the proof
of Lemma 3.4.12 Thus, the protocol shown in Figure 1 has a DGEF of exactly ten in total. ❑
Thinking of manipulation aspects, there may be players who try to gain most of the cake for
themselves, or who intentionally try to make other players envious. To prevent this from happening,
cake-cutting protocols should be strategy-proof.
Definition 4.3 A proportional cake-cutting protocol is said to be strategy-proof if a cheating player
is no longer guaranteed a proportional share, whereas all other players are still guaranteed to
receive their proportional share.
In a strategy-proof proportional protocol, a cheater (i.e., a player who doesn’t play truthfully)
cannot harm any of the other players with respect to proportionality, and may even jeopardize
receiving a proportional share of the cake for him- or herself.
It is worth noting that the definition of strategy-proofness is slightly stronger when restricted to
envy-free cake-cutting protocols. An envy-free cake-cutting protocol is said to be strategy-proof if a
cheating player is no longer guaranteed to not envy any other player, whereas all other players are.
That is, a strategy-proof envy-free cake-cutting protocol is resistant to manipulation in the sense that
for a player to be guaranteed to not envy any other player, he or she is required to play truthfully.
Theorem 4.4 The proportional cake-cutting protocol in Figure 1 is strategy-proof in the sense of
Definition 4.3.
Proof. When analyzing the strategy-proofness of the protocol in Figure 1, only decisions made
in Steps 1 through 3 need to be considered, since the Selfridge–Conway protocol has already been
proven to be strategy-proof (see, e.g., [BT96]). So, in each of the following three cases, we thus will
consider only Steps 1 through 3 of the protocol. Moreover, it is assumed that there is exactly one
cheater (i.e., one player not playing truthfully) that is trying to get more than a proportional share,
call him or her pc, 1 ≤ c ≤ 4.
Case 1: If pc is the player to drop out in Step 3 with portion Cc = [mc,1], vc(mc,1) > 1/4, then
the cheater would receive more than a proportional share according to his or her measure.
However, all other players are still guaranteed a proportional share, since all of them consider
portion Cc as being worth at most 1/4 according to their measures, so they all consider the
remaining part of the cake to be worth at least 3/4.
12More specifically, consider the following scenario. Suppose the fourth player dropped out in Step 3 (so j = 4), and
p4 values his or her portion C4 to be worth exactly 1/4 and the remaining cake [0,m4] to be worth exactly 3/4. If we
set the valuation functions such that v1(C1) = v2(C2) = v3(C3) = 1/4, v4(C1) = 1/8, and v4(C2) = v4(C3) = 5/16 (thus,
v4(C1)+v4(C2)+v4(C3) = 3/4), dividing cake C into C1, C2, C3, and C4 results in a proportional division such that player
p4 envies players p2 and p3.
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Case 2: If the cheater, pc, would have dropped out in Step 3 with portion Cc = [mc,1] when telling
the truth (i.e., vc(mc,1) = 1/4 and vi(mc,1)≤ 1/4 with 1≤ i≤ 4 and i 6= c) but now is not (since
pc makes a mark at m′c with m′c < mc), then the cheater may end up with even less than 1/4.
Let us see why this is true. In this case, another player, p j, drops out in Step 3 with portion
C j = [m j,1], where m′c ≤m j ≤mc, which determines the subpart of the cake for Step 4 and the
following steps to be [0,m j]. According to the measure of the cheater, subpart [0,m j] is worth
at most 3/4, since he or she values [m j,1] as being worth at least 1/4, as assumed beforehand.
Applying the Selfridge–Conway protocol to subpart [0,m j] guarantees each of the involved
players at least a proportional share, which results for the cheater in a portion that may be
worth even less than (1/3)(3/4) = 1/4 (namely, if m j < mc). (Note that this is the point where
the cheater loses his or her guarantee for a proportional share via cheating.)
Again, all other players are still guaranteed a proportional share. The player receiving portion
C j = [m j,1] values this portion as being 1/4. The two remaining players both value subpart
[0,m j] to be worth at least 3/4, and thus receive a portion that is worth at least (1/3)(3/4)
according to their measures.
Case 3: If the cheater does not drop out in Step 3 by cheating, nor would have dropped out in Step 3
if he or she would have been truthfully, then this would not influence the division at all. The
player dropping out in Step 3 with portion C j = [m j,1] values this portion as being 1/4, and
the remaining players receive a proportional share of subpart [0,m j], which all of them value
at least 3/4, even the cheater.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.4. ❑
Moreover, just a little change in the procedure can make the protocol presented above to provide
not just a simple fair but a strong fair division for four players, which means that every player
considers the portion received to be worth strictly more than one quarter of C.
Theorem 4.5 The cake-cutting protocol in Figure 1 can be modified so as to yield a strong fair
division, provided that exactly one player makes a mark in Step 1 that is closest to 1 (with respect
to the interval [0,1]).
Proof. Figure 2 shows only the modified steps of the protocol in Figure 1 that are required to
achieve a strong fair division.
Let p j be the unique player whose mark in Step 1 is closest to 1. According to Step 2 in
Figure 2, let pk be any player such that ‖[m j,1]‖< ‖[mk,1]‖ and there is no player pℓ, 1≤ j,k, ℓ≤ 4,
‖{ j,k, ℓ}‖ = 3, with ‖[mℓ,1]‖ < ‖[mk,1]‖, where ties can be broken arbitrarily. Step 3 in Figure 2
assures that player p j is dropping out with a portion that is worth strictly more than 1/4 according to
his or her measure,13 since p j receives a portion that is bigger and thus is worth more than the one
he or she has marked as being worth exactly 1/4. The three remaining players continue by applying a
proportional protocol to a part of the cake that all of them consider to be worth strictly more than 3/4.
13Recall that we assumed the axiom of positivity, which requires nonempty pieces of cake to have a nonzero value for
each player, see also Footnote 3.
13
Thus, each of the players receives a portion that is worth strictly more than 1/4 according to his or
her measure, which results in a strong fair division. ❑
Step 2. Find any players p j and pk such that ‖[m j,1]‖ < ‖[mk,1]‖ and there is no
player pℓ, 1 ≤ j,k, ℓ ≤ 4, ‖{ j,k, ℓ}‖ = 3, with ‖[mℓ,1]‖ < ‖[mk,1]‖. (Ties
can be broken arbitrarily.)
Step 3. Set m = mk + (m j−mk)/2 and assign portion C j = [m,1] to player p j and let p j
drop out.
Denote the remaining players by p1, p2, and p3, without loss of generality, and let vi be
pi’s valuation function.
Step 4. Let player p1 cut [0,m] into three pieces, say cx, cy and cz, of equal value
according to v1.
Figure 2: Modified steps in the protocol of Figure 1 to achieve a strong fair division for four players.
4.2 A Proportional Protocol with an Enhanced DGEF for any Number of Players
Figure 3 shows a finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol with an enhanced DGEF for n
players, where n≥ 3 is arbitrary. Again, we give both the rules and the strategies at once, and players
have to follow the rules and strategies in order to obtain a proportional share of the cake. Unless
specified otherwise, ties in this protocol can be broken arbitrarily. With respect to the DGEF results
of previously known finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocols given in Table 1 (see also
Section 5), the Last Diminisher protocol14 shows the best results for n ≥ 6, whereas the best results
for n < 6 are achieved by the Last Diminisher protocol as well as both the Divide and Conquer
protocols [EP84, BJK07]. The protocol presented in Figure 3 improves upon these protocols in
terms of the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness for all n ≥ 3 and, in particular, improves upon the
DGEF of the Last Diminisher protocol by ⌈n/2⌉−1 additional guaranteed envy-free-relations.15
Both the protocol in Figure 3 and the Last Diminisher protocol are, more or less, based on the
same idea of determining a piece of minimal size that is valued exactly 1/n by one of the players
(who is still in the game), which guarantees that all other players (who are still in the game) will
not envy this player for receiving this particular piece. However, the protocol in Figure 3 works in a
more parallel way, which makes its enhanced DGEF of
⌈
n2/2
⌉
+1 possible (see Theorem 4.9), and
it forbears from using trimmings. To ensure that working in a parallel manner indeed pays off in
terms of increasing the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness, the “inner loop” (Steps 4.1 through 4.3)
of the protocol is decisive.
In addition, the protocol in Figure 3 always provides a proportional division (see Theorem 4.7)
in a finite bounded number of steps (see Theorem 4.8), it can be proven to be strategy-proof (in
the sense of Definition 4.3, see Theorem 4.10), and analogously to the modification described in
14This protocol has been developed by Banach and Knaster and was first presented in Steinhaus [Ste48].
15Recall that we ignore the trivial cases n = 1 and n = 2, see Footnote 10. Moreover, in the special case of n = 4 the
DGEF of the protocol in Figure 3 is (n2/2)+ 2 = 10 and thus improves the DGEF of the Last Diminisher protocol by
even n/2 = 2 guaranteed envy-free-relations, see Theorem 4.2.
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Section 4.1, this protocol can be adjusted to provide a strong fair division for suitable valuation
functions of the players (see Theorem 4.11). All of the above properties are shared also by the Last
Diminisher protocol (see, e.g., [RW98]).
Remark 4.6 Some remarks on the protocol in Figure 3 are in order:
1. From a very high-level perspective the procedure is as follows: The protocol runs over several
rounds in each of which it is to find a player p j who takes a portion from the left side of the
cake, and to find a player pk who takes a disjoint portion from the right side of the cake,
such that none of the players still in the game envy p j or pk (at this, appropriate “inner-loop
handling” might be necessary, see Figure 3 for details). Thereafter, p j and pk are to drop
out with their portions, and a new round is started with the remaining cake (which is being
renormalized, see Remarks 3 and 5 below) and the remaining players. Finally, the Selfridge–
Conway protocol is applied to the last three players in the game.
2. Note that this protocol is applied only if there are more than two players in total. If there is
just one player then he or she receives all the cake, and if there are only two players then the
simple cut-and-choose protocol is applied (see Footnote 10).
3. Regarding n ≥ 5 players, if at any stage of our protocol the same player marks both the
leftmost smallest piece and the rightmost smallest piece, the cake may be split up into two
pieces and later on merged again. To simplify matters, in such a case the interval boundaries
are adapted as well, which is expressed in Step 8 of Figure 3. Simply put, the two parts of
the cake are set next to each other again to ensure a seamless transition. This can be done
without any loss in value due to additivity of the players’ valuation functions.
4. Note that if the inner loop (Steps 4.1 through 4.3) has not been executed in an outer-loop
iteration (Steps 1 through 8), we have ρ = ρ ′. This is the special case of zero iterations of
the inner loop. Consequently, if ρ = ρ ′ then the portion Ck = [ρk,ρ ] assigned to player pk
in Step 6 is the same as Ck = [ρk,ρ ′] in the general case, and the values for ρ := ρk and
C′ := [λ j,ρk] that are set in Step 8 in this case are special cases of ρ := ρ − ρ ′+ ρk and
C′ := [λ j,ρk]∪ [ρ ′,ρ ] (since if ρ = ρ ′ then [ρ ′,ρ ] degenerates to a single point, which is
valued zero by the axiom of divisibility, see Footnote 4). However, to make the protocol in
Figure 3 easier to comprehend, we have stated these special cases explicitly in addition to the
general case.
5. In Steps 1 and 9.1, the value of subcake C′ ⊆C is renormalized such that vi(C′) = 1 for each
player pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, for the sake of convenience. In more detail, each player pi values C′ at
least s/n of C, i.e., vi(C′) ≥ (s/n) · vi(C). The latter holds true since each of the s players still
in the game values the union of the n− s portions already assigned to be worth at most (n−s)/n
of C. Thus, by receiving a proportional share (valued 1/s) of C′ each player pi is guaranteed
at least a proportional share (valued 1/n) of C.
6. Note that Steps 9.1 through 9.3 of the protocol in Figure 3 correspond to Steps 1 through 3
of the protocol in Figure 1, and that Steps 9.1 through 9.4 are performed exactly if the initial
number n of players is even.
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Input: Cake C, and n players p1, p2, . . . , pn, where pi has valuation function vi.
Output: Mapping of portions Ci to players pi, where C =
⋃n
i=1Ci.
Initialization: Set λ := 0, ρ := 1, ρ ′ := ρ , s := n, and C′ := [0,1] =C.
While there are more than four players (i.e., s > 4), perform the outer loop (Steps 1 through 8).
Step 1. Let players pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, each make two marks at λi and ρi with λi,ρi ∈
C′ such that vi(λ ,λi) = 1/s and vi(ρi,ρ) = 1/s; note that vi(C′) = 1 (see
Remark 4.6.5).
Step 2. Find any player p j such that there is no player pz, 1 ≤ j,z ≤ s, j 6= z, with
‖[λ ,λz]‖< ‖[λ ,λ j]‖.
Step 3. Find any player pk such that there is no player pz, 1 ≤ k,z ≤ s, k 6= z, with
‖[ρz,ρ ]‖ < ‖[ρk,ρ ]‖. If more than one player fulfills this condition for pk,
and p j is one of them, choose pk other than p j.
If j 6= k, go directly to Step 5, else repeat the inner loop (Steps 4.1 through 4.3) until p j and
pk are found such that j 6= k, where p j marks the leftmost smallest piece and pk marks the
rightmost smallest piece.
Step 4.1. Set ρ ′ := ρk.
Step 4.2. Let players pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, each make a mark at ρi with ρi ∈ C′ such that
vi(ρi,ρ ′) = 1/s.
Step 4.3. Find player pk such that there is no player pz, 1 ≤ k,z ≤ s, k 6= z, with
‖[ρz,ρ ′]‖ < ‖[ρk,ρ ′]‖. If more than one player fulfills this condition for pk,
and p j is one of them, choose pk other than p j.
Step 5. Assign portion C j = [λ ,λ j] to player p j.
Step 6. If ρ = ρ ′, assign portion Ck = [ρk,ρ ] to player pk, else assign portion Ck =
[ρk,ρ ′] to player pk (see Remark 4.6.4).
Step 7. Let players p j and pk drop out.
Step 8. Adapt the interval boundaries of the remaining cake C′ for the round / step to
follow: If ρ = ρ ′, set C′ := [λ j,ρk] and ρ := ρk, else set C′ := [λ j,ρk]∪ [ρ ′,ρ ]
and ρ := ρ − ρ ′+ ρk (see Remarks 4.6.3 and 4.6.4). Set λ := λ j, ρ ′ := ρ ,
and s := s−2.
Perform Steps 9.1 through 9.4 if and only if there are four players (i.e., s = 4). If there are three
players (i.e., s = 3), go directly to Step 10.
Step 9.1. Let each pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s = 4, make a mark at ρi ∈C′ such that vi(ρi,ρ) = 1/s =
1/4; note that vi(C′) = 1 (see Remark 4.6.5).
Step 9.2. Find any player p j such that there is no player pk, 1 ≤ j,k ≤ s, j 6= k with
‖[ρk,ρ ]‖< ‖[ρ j,ρ ]‖.
Step 9.3. Assign portion C j = [ρ j,ρ ] to player p j. Let player p j drop out.
Step 9.4. Set ρ := ρ j, C′ := [λ ,ρ ], and s := s−1.
Step 10. Divide the remaining cake C′ among the s = 3 remaining players via the
Selfridge–Conway protocol (as described in Steps 4 through 12 in Figure 1).
Figure 3: A proportional protocol with an enhanced DGEF of
⌈
n2/2
⌉
+1 for n ≥ 3 players.
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Theorem 4.7 The cake-cutting protocol in Figure 3 is proportional.
Proof. In the case of n being even, all four players entering Step 9.1 consider C′ at this stage to
be worth at least s/n = 4/n of C, since each of them values the union of the n− 4 portions already
assigned to be worth at most (n−4)/n of C. The same argument can be applied to the three players that
enter Step 10 in the case of n being odd. Thus, from Step 9.1 on, which is the part when there are no
more than four players left, the protocol provides a proportional division according to Theorem 4.1.
When there are more than four players in total, either the first n−4 players (if n is even), or the
first n−3 players (if n is odd), receive a portion they each value to be worth at least 1/n according to
Steps 1 and 4.2, since each of these players receives a portion he or she once specified to be worth
exactly 1/s of C′, while valuing C′ at least s/n of C (see Remark 4.6.5).
Thus, the cake-cutting protocol in Figure 3 always provides a proportional division for any
number n ≥ 3 of players. ❑
Theorem 4.8 The cake-cutting protocol in Figure 3 is finite bounded.
Proof. The protocol in Figure 3 has only a finite number of steps—with two loops though. The
outer loop (which repeats Steps 1 through 8 as long as there are more than either four players if
n is even, or three players if n is odd) is iterated (n−4)/2 times if n is even, and is iterated (n−3)/2
times if n is odd. The inner loop (which repeats Steps 4.1 through 4.3 until two distinct players are
found to which the two outermost pieces are assigned, one player receiving that from the present
left and the other player receiving that from the present right boundary) is iterated at most s− 2
times per outer-loop iteration with s players, summing up to at most ∑⌈(n−4)/2⌉i=1 (n−2i) iterations of
the inner loop in total. Let us see why this is true. For each outer-loop iteration with s players,
the inner loop is iterated as long as the player that marked the leftmost smallest piece also marks
the rightmost smallest piece (with respect to the current right boundary ρ ′) and there is no tie with
another player for the rightmost smallest piece. With respect to every single player pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s,
when setting vi(C′) = 1, the division of C′ into pieces valued 1/s each results in s disjoint pieces.
Two of these s pieces have been identified in Steps 2 and 3 already and thus only s−2 more pieces
can be identified. At this, let p j be the player that is to be assigned the leftmost smallest piece [λ ,λ j]
in Step 5 and the only player that marked the rightmost smallest piece [ρ j,ρ ]. Then there must be
a player pk, k 6= j, with vk(λ ,λ j) ≤ 1/s and vk(ρ j,ρ) < 1/s, and there is at least one piece [ρk,ρ ′]
among the s− 2 remaining pieces for which it is true that vk(ρk,ρ ′) = 1/s and v j(ρk,ρ ′) ≤ 1/s, i.e.,
for some ρ ′ it holds that ‖[ρk,ρ ′]‖ ≤ ‖[ρ j,ρ ′]‖. Hence, within any outer-loop iteration, the inner
loop stops after at most s− 2 iterations. Counting in single steps, Steps 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8
each are repeated ⌈(n−4)/2⌉ times, Steps 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 each are repeated at most ∑⌈(n−4)/2⌉i=1 (n−2i)
times, Steps 9.1 through 9.4 each are repeated at most once, and Step 10 involves at most nine more
steps (according to Figure 1). Thus, in terms of single steps as presented in Figure 3, the protocol
is bounded by (7 · ⌈(n−4)/2⌉)+ (3 ·∑⌈(n−4)/2⌉i=1 (n−2i))+ 4+ 9 steps. Thus, the protocol in Figure 3
carries out only finitely many operations and is finite bounded. ❑
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Theorem 4.9 For n ≥ 5 players, the cake-cutting protocol in Figure 3 has
⌈
n2/2
⌉
+ 1 guaranteed
envy-free-relations.16
Proof. The DGEF of the protocol in Figure 3 increases every time a portion is assigned to a
player. Considering Steps 1 through 8 of any outer-loop iteration with s players, player p j (the
player receiving the leftmost smallest piece in Step 5 and dropping out with this portion in Step 7)
will not be envied by any of the s− 1 other players. Regarding player pk (the player receiving the
rightmost smallest piece in Step 6 and dropping out with this portion in Step 7), two cases need to be
considered—the best case and the worst case. In the best case, player pk immediately is not the same
one as player p j. In the worst case, players p j and pk are one and the same player (i.e., j = k) in
Step 3, and Steps 4.1 through 4.3 need to be executed. In this case, as already mentioned in the proof
of Theorem 4.8, there must be at least one piece [ρk,ρ ′] with vk(ρk,ρ ′) = 1/s and v j(ρk,ρ ′) ≤ 1/s,
i.e., for some ρ ′ it holds that ‖[ρk,ρ ′]‖ ≤ ‖[ρ j,ρ ′]‖. Consequently, in both the best and the worst
case the player receiving the rightmost smallest piece (with respect to the current right boundary,
either ρ or some ρ ′) will not be envied by any of the s− 1 other players, not even by player p j.
However, none of the players p j and pk can be guaranteed to be not envied by more than s− 1
players according to the proof of Lemma 3.4.
Since the outer loop is repeated ⌈(n−4)/2⌉ times, the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations
among the players sums up to
(
n2/2
)
− 8 when n is even, and to ⌊n2/2⌋− 4 =
⌈
n2/2
⌉
− 5 when n is
odd. Note that s is decreasing in every outer-loop iteration, and so 1/s is increasing, which implies
that no player receiving a portion valued 1/s at a later outer-loop iteration will envy any of those
players that received a portion in one of the previous outer-loop iterations. To verify the latter, let
us denote by C′t the subcake to be divided and by st the number of players participating in outer-
loop iteration t with 2 ≤ t ≤ ⌈(n−4)/2⌉. Considering any outer-loop iteration t − 1 with cake C′t−1
being renormalized such that vi(C′t−1) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ st−1, each of the two players dropping out in
iteration t −1 receives a portion he or she values exactly 1/st−1 of C′t−1 and which is valued at most
1/st−1 of C′t−1 by the remaining players, where vi(C′t−1) ≥ st−1/n (see Remark 4.6.5). Consequently,
all players p j, 1 ≤ j ≤ st , participating in outer-loop iteration t value subcake C′t to be worth at
least st/st−1 of C′t−1, i.e., v j(C′t) ≥ (st/st−1) · v j(C′t−1), and the two players dropping out in iteration t
both receive a portion valued 1/st of subcake C′t . Thus, players dropping out in outer-loop iteration t
receive each a portion that is valued at least 1/st−1 of C′t−1 according to their measures.
Once the outer loop has been completed, either four (if n is even) or three (if n is odd) players
are left. If there are four players left, three more envy-free-relations can be guaranteed by executing
Steps 9.1 through 9.4, as the three remaining players will not envy the player receiving the fourth-
to-last portion, but no more than three envy-free-relations can be guaranteed, again by the proof of
Lemma 3.4. In addition, the three last players entering Step 10 will not envy each other, because
the Selfridge–Conway protocol always provides an envy-free division. Accordingly, six more envy-
free-relations are guaranteed. Summing up, the protocol in Figure 3 has a DGEF of
⌈
n2/2
⌉
+1. ❑
Theorem 4.10 The proportional cake-cutting protocol in Figure 3 is strategy-proof in the sense of
Definition 4.3.
16Note that the same formula holds if n = 3, but for the special case of n = 4 even one more envy-free-relation can be
guaranteed (see Theorem 4.2).
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Proof. From Step 9.1 on (when at most four players are left), the protocol has been proven to
be strategy-proof in Theorem 4.4. With respect to Steps 1 through 8, three different cases need to
be considered, each of which applies analogously to both assigning the leftmost smallest piece and
assigning the rightmost smallest piece. Note that a cheating attempt on one of the pieces does not
influence the assignment of the other. The same three cases apply when there is a cheating attempt
on the rightmost smallest piece and Steps 4.1 through 4.3 need to be executed. In the following
case distinction, given any iteration t of the outer loop and cake C′t = [λ ,ρ ] with vi(C′t) = 1 for all
players pi, 1≤ i≤ st , we will consider only the situation when there is exactly one player not telling
the truth with respect to the leftmost smallest piece, trying to get more than a proportional share.
Let pc be this cheating player, where 1 ≤ c ≤ st .
Case 1: If pc is the player receiving portion Cc =[λ ,λc] with vc(λ ,λc)> 1/st in Step 5 (and dropping
out in Step 7), then pc would receive more than a proportional share. However, all st −1 other
players are still guaranteed a proportional share, since all of them consider portion Cc as being
worth at most 1/st of C′t according to their measures, so they all consider the remaining part of
the cake to be worth at least (st−1)/st of C′t .
Case 2: If the cheater, pc, would have received portion Cc = [λ ,λc] in Step 5 when telling the
truth (so vc(λ ,λc) = 1/st and vi(λ ,λc) ≤ 1/st with 1 ≤ i ≤ st and i 6= c) but now is not (since
pc is making a mark at λ ′c with λc < λ ′c), then the cheater could end up with even less than
a proportional share. Let us see why this holds true. In this case, another player, p j with
j 6= c, receives portion C j = [λ ,λ j], λc ≤ λ j ≤ λ ′c, which determines the left boundary of C′t+1
(the remaining cake to be continued with) to be λ j. According to the measure of player pc,
[λ j,ρ ] is worth at most (st−1)/st of C′t , because he or she values [λ ,λ j] to be worth at least 1/st
of C′t , as assumed beforehand.
However, since the protocol works in a parallel way, this loss in value may be compensated for
by some gain in value with respect to the rightmost smallest piece Ck = [ρk,ρ ′′] that is assigned
in Step 6 (where ρk is the left boundary of the rightmost smallest piece marked by some player
pk, ‖{c, j,k}‖ = 3, and ρ ′′ is the current right boundary, i.e., either ρ ′′ = ρ or ρ ′′ = ρ ′). That
is, if vc(λc,λ j) ≤ vc(ρc,ρk) then the loss player pc experiences by cheating with respect to
the leftmost smallest piece is made up for by an accidentally sufficient gain relative to the
assignment of the rightmost smallest piece.17 However, if vc(λc,λ j) > vc(ρc,ρk) then no
sufficient compensation takes place and player pc considers C′t+1 = [λ j,ρk], which is the part
of the cake to be continued with and to be divided among st − 2 players, as being worth at
most (st−2)/st of C′t . Thus, in this case player pc is not guaranteed a portion that is worth at
least 1/n of C in total (according to his or her measure), even though the protocol would be
proportional if all players were playing by the rules and strategies required by the protocol.
Again, all other players are still guaranteed a proportional share. Players p j and pk both value
their portion to be 1/st of C′t , and the st −3 remaining players consider C′t+1 = [λ j,ρk] (which
is to be divided among st −2 players) as being worth at least (st−2)/st of C′t .
17Note that the compensation for the cheater’s loss may also be accumulated over the following rounds as long as the
cheater has not been assigned a portion yet.
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Note that if the cheater marks the rightmost smallest piece in the very same outer-loop
iteration in which he or she is cheating on the leftmost smallest piece and happens to receive
the rightmost smallest piece, then there is no influence on the portions to be assigned in this
outer-loop iteration, as even the cheater will receive a proportional share being worth 1/st of
C′t according to his or her measure.
Case 3: If the cheater does not receive the leftmost smallest portion C j = [λ ,λ j] by cheating nor
would have received this portion when telling the truth, then this would not at all affect the
leftmost portion to be assigned in this particular outer-loop iteration. The player receiving
portion C j = [λ ,λ j] in Step 5 values this portion as being 1/st of C′t , and the remaining players
(except for some player pk, j 6= k, that is assigned the rightmost smallest piece) continue the
procedure with C′t+1 = [λ j,ρk] (where ρk is the left boundary of the rightmost smallest piece
marked by pk), which each of them values at least (st−2)/st of C′t , even the cheater.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.10. ❑
Figure 4 shows how to adapt the protocol in Figure 3 so as to achieve a strong fair division.
Again, note that if the inner loop (Steps 4.1 through 4.3) has not been executed in an outer-loop
iteration (Steps 1 through 8), we have the special case of zero inner-loop iterations and ρ = ρ ′. In
this case, portion Ck = [ρk −mr,ρ ] assigned to player pk in Step 6 is the same as Ck = [ρk −mr,ρ ′]
in the general case, and the values for ρ := ρk−mr and C′ := [λ j +mℓ,ρk−mr] that are set in Step 8
in this case are special cases of ρ := ρ −ρ ′+ρk −mr and C′ := [λ j +mℓ,ρk −mr]∪ [ρ ′,ρ ] (again,
since [ρ ′,ρ ] degenerates to a single point if ρ = ρ ′, which is valued zero by the axiom of divisibility,
see Footnote 4).
Theorem 4.11 For n > 3 players, modifying the first iteration of the cake-cutting protocol in
Figure 3 according to Figure 4 yields a strong fair division, provided that in this iteration exactly
one player makes a mark that is closest to the left boundary and exactly one distinct player makes a
mark that is closest to the right boundary.
Proof. For n = 4 players, the protocol in Figure 3 is the same as the protocol in Figure 1 and thus
can be modified so as to yield a strong fair division according to Theorem 4.5, see Figure 2.
For n > 4 players, consider the very first outer-loop iteration (Steps 1 through 8) of the protocol.
Let p j be the unique player whose mark in Step 1 is closest to the left boundary λ , and let pk, j 6= k,
be the unique player whose mark in Step 1 is closest to the right boundary ρ (if the inner loop needs
to be executed, let pk be the unique player whose mark in Step 4.2 is closest to the current right
boundary ρ ′). According to Step 2 in Figure 4, let pℓ be any player such that ‖[λ ,λ j]‖ < ‖[λ ,λℓ]‖
and there is no player pz, 1 ≤ j, ℓ,z ≤ s, ‖{ j, ℓ,z}‖ = 3, with ‖[λ ,λz]‖ < ‖[λ ,λℓ]‖, where ties can
be broken arbitrarily. Analogously, according to Step 3 (respectively, Step 4.3) in Figure 4, let pr
be any player such that ‖[ρk,ρ ]‖ < ‖[ρr,ρ ]‖ (respectively, ‖[ρk,ρ ′]‖ < ‖[ρr,ρ ′]‖) and there is no
player pz, 1 ≤ k,r,z ≤ s, ‖{k,r,z}‖ = 3, with ‖[ρz,ρ ]‖ < ‖[ρr,ρ ]‖ (‖[ρz,ρ ′]‖< ‖[ρr,ρ ′]‖). Steps 5
and 6 in Figure 4 assure that players p j and pk each are assigned a portion that, according to their
measures, is worth strictly more than 1/s of C′ (which is worth at least as much as 1/n of C by the
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argument of Remark 4.6.5),18 since p j and pk each receive a portion that is bigger and thus is worth
more than the one they have marked as being worth exactly 1/s of C′ in Step 1.
By the same argument, the n−2 remaining players continue by applying a proportional protocol
to a part of the cake that all of them consider to be worth strictly more than (n−2)/n of C. Thus, each
of the players receives a portion that is worth strictly more than 1/n of C according to his or her
measure, which results in a strong fair division. ❑
Step 2. Find any players p j and pℓ such that ‖[λ ,λ j]‖ < ‖[λ ,λℓ]‖ and there is no
player pz,1 ≤ j, ℓ,z ≤ s, ‖{ j, ℓ,z}‖ = 3, with ‖[λ ,λz]‖< ‖[λ ,λℓ]‖. Set mℓ :=
(λℓ−λ j)/2.
Step 3. Find any players pk and pr such that ‖[ρk,ρ ]‖ < ‖[ρr,ρ ]‖ and there is no
player pz, 1 ≤ k,r,z ≤ s, ‖{k,r,z}‖ = 3, with ‖[ρz,ρ ]‖< ‖[ρr,ρ ]‖. If there is
more than one player fulfilling this condition for player pk, and player p j is
one of them, choose player pk other than p j. Set mr := (ρk−ρr)/2.
Step 4.3. Find any players pk and pr such that ‖[ρk,ρ ′]‖ < ‖[ρr,ρ ′]‖ and there is no
player pz, 1 ≤ k,r,z ≤ s, ‖{k,r,z}‖ = 3, with ‖[ρz,ρ ′]‖ < ‖[ρr,ρ ′]‖. If there
is more than one player fulfilling this condition for player pk, and player p j
is one of them, choose player pk other than p j. Set mr := (ρk−ρr)/2.
Step 5. Assign portion C j = [λ ,λ j +mℓ] to player p j.
Step 6. If ρ = ρ ′, assign portion Ck = [ρk −mr,ρ ] to player pk, else assign portion
Ck = [ρk −mr,ρ ′] to player pk.
Step 8. If ρ = ρ ′, set C′ := [λ j +mℓ,ρk −mr] and ρ := ρk −mr, else set C′ := [λ j +
mℓ,ρk −mr]∪ [ρ ′,ρ ] and ρ := ρ −ρ ′+ρk −mr. Set λ := λ j +mℓ, ρ ′ := ρ ,
and s := s−2.
Step 9.2. Find any players p j and pk such that ‖[ρ j,ρ ]‖ < ‖[ρk,ρ ]‖ and there is no
player pℓ, 1≤ j,k, ℓ≤ s, ‖{ j,k, ℓ}‖= 3, with ‖[ρℓ,ρ ]‖< ‖[ρk,ρ ]‖. Set mr :=
(ρ j−ρk)/2.
Step 9.3. Assign portion C j = [ρ j −mr,ρ ] to player p j. Let player p j drop out.
Step 9.4. Set ρ := ρ j −mr and C′ := [λ ,ρ ]. Set s := s−1.
Figure 4: Modified steps in the first iteration of the protocol in Figure 3 to achieve a strong fair
division for n > 3 players.
5 Proof of Theorem 3.5
In this section, we determine the degrees of guaranteed envy-freeness of the proportional cake-
cutting protocols listed in Table 1. Thus, we prove Theorem 3.5 via Lemmas 5.1 through 5.6. We
investigate proportional protocols only, because proportional cake-cutting protocols have a DGEF
of at least n according to Proposition 3.3 and, thus, show some degree of fairness already.
18Recall that we assumed the axiom of positivity, which requires nonempty pieces of cake to have a nonzero value for
each player, see Footnote 3 for more discussion of this point.
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Over the years, several cake-cutting protocols have been proven to be proportional and finite
bounded for any number n of players. A detailed description of various finite bounded proportional
protocols can be found in the books by Brams and Taylor [BT96] and Robertson and Webb [RW98].
Our analysis of the protocols in Table 1 provides a basis for further algorithmic improvements in
terms of the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness, and the protocol in Figure 3 is a first step in this
direction.
In the following subsections, we give a brief description of the protocols listed in Table 1 and
provide a detailed analysis of their DGEF. Note that the value of cake C to be divided is normalized
such that vi(C) = 1 for all players pi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5.1 Last Diminisher
The protocol works as follows: The first player cuts a piece he or she considers being worth exactly
1/n in his or her measure. This piece is given to the n− 1 other players, one after the other. Now,
each player has the choice to either pass the piece on as it is, or to trim it before passing it on. If a
player considers the piece to be worth more than 1/n, he or she trims it to exactly 1/n according to
his or her measure. When the last player has evaluated this piece, it is given to the player who was
the last trimming it, or to the player who cut it in the first place if no trimmings have been made.
The trimmings are reassembled with the remainder of the cake, and the procedure is applied in the
same way for the n−1 remaining players and the reassembled remainder of the cake. This process
is repeated until only two players remain. In the final round (of n−1 rounds in total), these last two
players apply the simple cut-and-choose protocol to the remainder of the cake. For guaranteeing
each player a proportional share of the cake, the order of the players is of no significance.
Lemma 5.1 The Last Diminisher protocol has a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of 2+ n(n−1)/2.
Proof. Concerning the analysis of the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness, it is quite evident
that in the first round n− 1 envy-free-relations are guaranteed, since each of the n− 1 players not
receiving the first piece consider this piece to be of value at most 1/n. Analogously, in the kth round,
1 < k < n, n− k additional envy-free-relations are guaranteed. The number of guaranteed envy-
free-relations is consecutively decreasing by one per round, as the players who already received a
piece are not involved in the evaluation process of subsequent rounds (see the proof of Lemma 3.4).
This sums up to ∑n−1i=1 i = n(n−1)/2 guaranteed envy-free-relations. In addition, in the final round one
more guaranteed envy-free-relation is created, as the simple cut-and-choose protocol guarantees that
both of the players will not envy each other. Finally, note that the player receiving the first portion
is not involved in the evaluations of any other portions, but since the Last Diminisher protocol
is proportional, this player too cannot envy each of the other players according to the argument
in the proof of Proposition 3.3. Thus, one more guaranteed envy-free-relation must be added.
Consequently, the Last Diminisher protocol guarantees 2+ n(n−1)/2 envy-free-relations. ❑
5.2 Lone Chooser
The Lone Chooser protocol was first proposed by Fink [Fin64] (as cited in [Saa70, BT96]). It can be
described as follows. For two players, the protocol is just the simple cut-and-choose protocol. For
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n > 2 players, the protocol has n− 1 rounds. The first round simply describes the cut-and-choose
protocol executed by players p1 and p2, which results in two pieces, c1 and c2, with C = c1 ∪ c2.
Assuming player p1 received piece c1 and player p2 received piece c2, in the second round player
p1 has to divide piece c1 with player p3, and player p2 has to divide piece c2 with player p3. To
this end, p1 cuts c1 into three pieces each of which he or she considers to be worth at least 1/6, and
so does p2 with c2. Player p3 then chooses one of the pieces of player p1 and one of the pieces of
player p2, both being most valuable according to p3’s measure. This guarantees each of the players
p1, p2, and p3 a portion of at least 1/3 in their measures. Carrying on in this way, when the final
round has been entered, each of the players p1, p2, . . . , pn−1 is in possession of a portion that he or
she considers to be worth at least 1/(n−1) in his or her measure. Let us refer to those n− 1 players
as the “cutters” of round n−1. Finally, each of the cutters p1, . . . , pn−1 cuts his or her portion into
n pieces each of value 1/(n2−n), and player pn, the “chooser” of round n− 1, chooses one piece of
highest value (according to his or her measure) from each plate of the n−1 cutters of this round.
Lemma 5.2 The Lone Chooser protocol has a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of n.
Proof. In the course of the Lone Chooser protocol, none of the players evaluate the portion of any
of the other players, which determines the DGEF of the Lone Chooser protocol to be n as a result
of Lemma 3.4. ❑
5.3 Lone Divider
A complete algorithmic description of this protocol would be rather comprehensive. That is why we
will give just a rough sketch of the procedure. For a more detailed description, the reader is referred
to Kuhn [Kuh67], see also, e.g., [BT96, RW98, Daw01].
The Lone Divider protocol works as follows: Some player pd , 1≤ d ≤ n, is chosen to be the first-
round “divider.” The divider cuts cake C into n portions that he or she considers each to be worth
1/n, i.e., vd(C j) = 1/n with 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Subsequently, all other players (the first-round “choosers”)
are asked to identify any of the n portions they find acceptable, that is, each player identifies all
portions that are worth at least 1/n in this player’s measure. Obviously, every chooser pc, c 6= d,
needs to accept at least one portion C j. Depending on the players’ choices, there are different
ways for how the protocol continues. In the simplest case, the players’ choices allow for a fully
decidable division, i.e., for a division such that each chooser pc receives one of the portions he
or she previously identified as being acceptable. Divider pd then receives the portion that has not
been assigned to any of the choosers. All players drop out and the division is complete. However,
if the players’ choices do not allow a fully decidable division, there is either a partially decidable
division (which means that only some—not all—of the choosers are assigned a portion and drop
out), or a fully undecidable division (which means that there are at least two portions that have not
been identified as being acceptable by any of the choosers and that none of the choosers receive
a portion). In the case of a partially decidable division, the choosers accomplish only a partial
allocation of the cake, i.e., those choosers that identified acceptable portions in a nonconflicting way
are assigned a portion they have marked as being acceptable and drop out. In addition, this round’s
divider is assigned any one of the other portions and drops out, the remaining portions (that could
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not be assigned to players) are reassembled, and a new round with the remaining players, among
which a new divider is to be chosen, is started. In the case of a fully undecidable division, none
of the choosers are assigned a portion; only this round’s divider receives one of the two portions
that have not been identified as being acceptable by any of the choosers and drops out, and a new
round with the remaining players, among which a new divider is to be chosen, is started in which
the remaining cake is divided. This procedure is repeated until the whole cake has been allocated.
Note that in each round at least this round’s divider is assigned a portion and drops out.
It is easy to see that the Lone Divider protocol is finite bounded and proportional.
Lemma 5.3 The Lone Divider protocol has a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of 2n−2.
Proof. The analysis of the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness is done by a worst-case scenario
in terms of the number of existing envy-free-relations. We claim that the maximum number of
guaranteed envy-free-relations exists in the case that every chooser pc marks n− 1 portions as
being acceptable in the first round. In the following, let us refer to this situation as the “worst-
case scenario.” In this scenario, the rules of the protocol imply that a proportional division will
be achieved in the very first round (i.e., in this worst case scenario the first round results in a fully
decidable division), and the following envy-free-relations are guaranteed to exist in this case. The
divider will not envy any of the choosers, as he or she considers each of the portions to be 1/n,
resulting in n−1 guaranteed envy-free-relations. Furthermore, none of the n−1 choosers will envy
the player (be it the divider or any of the other choosers) that received the portion he or she considers
to be not acceptable, leading to additional n−1 guaranteed envy-free-relations. Since the DGEF is
the maximum number of envy-free-relations that are guaranteed to exist in every case, the DGEF of
the Lone Divider protocol is at most 2n−2. To argue that the scenario given above indeed represents
the worst case for n ≥ 3 players (and so the DGEF is equal to 2n−2), we will consider all possible
cases different from the worst-case scenario. We will show that in each of these cases the number
of existing envy-free-relations is, in fact, higher than 2n− 2. This implies that none of these other
cases considered represent a worst-case scenario.
For notational convenience, we will use the term “case-enforced envy-free-relation” to refer to
the number of those envy-free-relations that necessarily must exist in any of these cases, regardless
of which particular valuation functions the players have (other than what was causing the respective
case to occur). Recall that the term “guaranteed envy-free-relation” is reserved for the number
of envy-free-relations that necessarily exist in the worst case (and—as we will see—none of the
cases below will describe the worst case). Thus, the term “case-enforced envy-free-relation” is
more general than and includes the term “guaranteed envy-free-relation”: The number of case-
enforced envy-free-relations in the worst case (i.e., the minimum number of case-enforced envy-
free-relations, where the minimum is taken over all possible cases) is exactly the number of
guaranteed envy-free-relations.
Case 1: The first round results in a fully decidable division. Consider the following two subcases.
Case 1.1: The total number of inacceptable portions is greater than in the worst-case
scenario. Specifically, let us look at the situation that exactly one of the choosers
considers just one more portion as being inacceptable than in the worst-case scenario.
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This change decrements the total number of acceptable portions by one and thus creates
one additional case-enforced envy-free-relation, since this chooser will not envy the
player receiving this particular portion. However, since the number of guaranteed envy-
free-relations of the worst-case scenario persists also in this case, increasing the total
number of inacceptable portions also increases the total number of case-enforced envy-
free-relations. Thus, the present case does not describe a worst-case scenario.
Case 1.2: The total number of acceptable portions is greater than in the worst-case scenario.
Specifically, let us look at the situation that exactly one of the choosers considers just
one more portion as being acceptable than in the worst-case scenario. This chooser
then accepts all portions, and thus necessarily considers each of the portions to be worth
exactly 1/n. Accordingly, this chooser does not envy any of the other players, resulting in
n−2 additional case-enforced envy-free-relations. In particular, since this chooser still
does not envy the player he or she did not envy in the worst-case scenario, incrementing
the total number of acceptable portions by just one increases the total number of case-
enforced envy-free-relations by one (if n = 3) or even more (if n > 3). Thus, the present
case does not describe a worst-case scenario.
Case 2: The first round does not result in a fully decidable division. Thus, the protocol runs over
more than one round. For n = 3 players, an additional round would be caused only by a
fully undecidable division. For n > 3 players, additional rounds are caused by either a fully
undecidable division or a partially decidable division. In every round, at least the divider of
this round is assigned a portion and drops out. On the part of the choosers, entering a new
round creates additional case-enforced envy-free-relations the number of which depends on
the present circumstances. Simply put, every additional round will increase the total number
of case-enforced envy-free-relations compared with the worst-case minimum of 2n−2. This
justifies why a division obtained by the execution of more than one round does not present a
worst-case scenario.
To see why running more than one round will lead to more than 2n− 2 case-enforced envy-
free-relations, let us first, in Cases 2.1 and 2.2, have a closer look at the case-enforced envy-
free-relations created in each nonfinal round if more than one round is executed in total.
The final round will be handled separately in Case 2.3. In particular, if there are exactly
two rounds, the total number of case-enforced envy-free-relations created is the sum of those
explained in the first paragraph of either Case 2.1 or Case 2.2 (which describe the number of
case-enforced envy-free-relations created in the first round) and those explained in Case 2.3
(which describes the number of case-enforced envy-free-relations created in the final round).
Case 2.1: In the case of a fully undecidable division of the cake as the result of the first round,
the first-round divider receives one of the portions that have not been marked as being
acceptable by any of the choosers and drops out. All n− 1 choosers enter the second
round and will not envy the divider of the first round, resulting in n− 1 case-enforced
envy-free-relations. Moreover, the first-round divider will not envy at least one of the
n−1 other players, since there must be at least one player he or she does not envy, which
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follows from the proof of Proposition 3.3. Thus, n case-enforced envy-free-relations
result from the first round in this case.
Note that Proposition 3.3 can be applied only to the first-round divider. Thus,
analogously to the above argument, for every additional round with s < n players that is
caused by a fully undecidable division and that is not the final round, s−1 case-enforced
envy-free-relations need to be added. An analysis of the final round follows in Case 2.3.
Case 2.2: In the case of a partially decidable division of the cake as the result of the first
round, let K denote the set of those k players, 1 < k < n− 1, that are in conflict with
each other concerning the portions they identified as being acceptable in this first round.
Let L be the set of the ℓ remaining players, where 1 < ℓ < n− 1 and n = k+ ℓ. The
players in L can divide a part of the cake without any conflict, i.e., each of the players
in L is assigned one of the portions he or she identified as being acceptable. Note that
ℓ = 1 would represent Case 2.1, and that the divider always is one of the players in L.
Following the protocol, each of the players in L receives a portion and drops out while
each of the players in K enters the second round. Since none of the players in K would
accept any of the portions the players in L have received, each of the players in K does
not envy any of the players in L, resulting in kℓ ≥ k+ ℓ = n case-enforced envy-free-
relations. The players in L (except for the first-round divider) that are assigned a portion
and drop out in the first round are each guaranteed one envy-free-relation due to the
argument in the proof of Proposition 3.3, summing up to ℓ−1 additional case-enforced
envy-free-relations. Moreover, the first-round divider will not envy any of the ℓ−1 other
players in L, resulting in ℓ− 1 more case-enforced envy-free-relations. Consequently,
2(ℓ−1)+ kℓ case-enforced envy-free-relations result from the first round in this case.
Now consider any additional round with s = k′+ ℓ′ players that is caused by a partially
decidable division of the cake and that is not the final round, where k′ players are
in conflict with each other and ℓ′ players accomplish a partial allocation of the cake.
Analogously to the above argument (except that Proposition 3.3 is no longer applicable),
k′ℓ′ case-enforced envy-free-relations are to be added for the k′ players being in conflict,
and ℓ′−1 case-enforced envy-free-relations are to be added for this round’s divider. An
analysis of the final round follows in Case 2.3.
Case 2.3: Aside from the case-enforced envy-free-relations that are created by executing
a nonfinal round, additional case-enforced envy-free-relations are created in the final
round, in which even the last player receives a portion. In each case, the final round
is characterized by providing a fully decidable division. Consequently, considering a
final round with s players at least 2(s−1) case-enforced envy-free-relations are created
according to Cases 1.1 and 1.2.
As a result, in the example of the protocol running a second round, either n+ 2(s− 1) = n+
2(n− 2) with s = n− 1 (see Case 2.1), or 2(ℓ− 1)+ kℓ+ 2(s− 1) = kℓ+ 2(n− 2) ≥ n+ 2(n− 2)
with s = k (see Case 2.2) envy-free-relations are case-enforced. Thus, since n ≥ 3, a second round
yields at least n+2(n−2) > 2n−2 case-enforced envy-free-relations in total. As indicated above,
every additional round increases the number of case-enforced envy-free-relations even more.
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Cases 1 and 2 (and their subcases) completely characterize all situations different from the worst
case scenario, since their number of case-enforced envy-free-relations is always greater than 2n−2,
the number of envy-free-relations guaranteed to exist in the scenario given in the first paragraph of
this proof. This justifies that this scenario indeed represents the worst case. Note that the protocol
does not require any of the choosers to value any of the portions they marked as being acceptable
(i.e., the only information provided on these portions is that they are considered to be worth at least
1/n), and thus, according to the proof of Lemma 3.4, the DGEF of the Lone Divider protocol is
2n−2. ❑
5.4 Cut Your Own Piece
The protocol works as follows: Every player pi marks n adjacent pieces each valued 1/n in his or
her measure, resulting in n(n− 1) marks in total. Afterwards, a cut is made at between n− 1 and
2(n− 1) of the existing marks, resulting in at least n adjacent pieces. Each player then is assigned
a portion that contains at least one of the pieces he or she marked beforehand plus some optional
supplement. There are different strategies for how to make cuts such that the resulting division is
fair. The number of cuts to be made depends on the strategy chosen. Note that there always is at
least one strategy that guarantees each player pi a portion valued at least 1/n according to his or her
measure, i.e., vi(Ci) ≥ 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n [Ste69]. If n− 1 cuts are made (at n− 1 of the existing
marks), each player’s portion consists of exactly one piece which is worth at least 1/n according to
his or her measure.
Lemma 5.4 The Cut Your Own Piece protocol has a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of n if no
strategy is specified, and a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of 2n−2 for the “left-right strategy”
(which, for convenience, will be explained in the proof). Moreover, for this protocol no strategy can
give a better DGEF than 2n−2.
Proof. As mentioned above, there are different strategies for how to make cuts such that the
resulting division is fair. If no particular strategy is given, this protocol has a DGEF of only n
(according to Lemma 3.4), since all players made their marks independently, and none of the players
were asked to give an evaluation of the marks of any of the other players. Hence, only the minimum
of n envy-free-relations can be guaranteed. Steinhaus [Ste69] did not mention a strategy for how to
achieve a simple fair division; he just mentioned that there always exists at least one.
However, when we consider a strategy that always assigns the leftmost (with respect to the
interval [0,1]) smallest piece to the player that marked this piece as being of value 1/n, and the
rightmost smallest piece to the player that marked this piece as being of value 1/n, this protocol
guarantees at least 2n−2 envy-free-relations. We call this strategy the left-right strategy.
In more detail, applying the left-right strategy we assign the leftmost piece to the player that
marked the smallest piece starting at 0, and we assign the rightmost piece to the player that marked
the smallest piece finishing at 1. That way it is guaranteed that the n− 2 remaining players each
consider the part of the cake between the assigned leftmost piece and the assigned rightmost piece
as being worth at least (n−2)/n. Thus, this subpart of the cake can be allocated to these n−2 players
according to the marks made in the first instance. Note that if the player that marked the leftmost
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smallest piece happens to be the same as the one that marked the rightmost smallest piece, the
rightmost piece is given to the player that marked the second smallest piece finishing at 1. If several
marks for the leftmost (respectively, for the rightmost) smallest piece coincide, any mark can be
chosen, without loss of generality. In this example, the terms “piece” and “portion” can be used
interchangeably, as this protocol assigns contiguous portions.
When applying the left-right strategy as described above, it is guaranteed that the player
receiving the leftmost smallest piece is not envied by any of the n− 1 remaining players, since
all of them value this piece at most 1/n according to their measures. Analogously, it is guaranteed
that the n−2 players in the “middle” do not envy the player receiving the rightmost smallest piece
as they value this piece at most 1/n. Note that if the player that marked the leftmost smallest piece is
the very same as the one that marked the rightmost smallest piece, this player may envy the player
receiving the rightmost piece, since in this case the rightmost piece to be assigned is just the second
smallest piece finishing at 1. Thus, only n−2 envy-free-relations can be guaranteed with respect to
the player receiving the rightmost piece. However, one more guaranteed envy-free-relation needs to
be added, as the player that marked and is assigned the leftmost smallest piece cannot envy each of
the other players (according to the argument in the proof of Proposition 3.3). Consequently, 2n−2
envy-free-relations can be guaranteed in total.
The DGEF achieved for the Cut Your Own Piece protocol by the application of the left-right
strategy cannot be enhanced by any other strategy. The latter is due to the fact that all pieces have
been marked without any mutual evaluations (as already mentioned above), and that no common
boundaries other than the left border of the leftmost piece and the right border of the rightmost
piece (with respect to the interval [0,1]), which could be used for subsequent comparisons of the
guaranteed sizes and thus values of the pieces marked, are known. ❑
5.5 Divide and Conquer
The Divide and Conquer protocol, which was first presented by Even and Paz [EP84] (see also, e.g.,
[RW98]), is based on the idea of dividing cake C by simultaneously partitioning disjoint parts of C.
The procedure slightly differs depending on whether the number of players is even or odd.
If there is an even number of players, say n = 2k for some integer k, all players but one divide
cake C in the ratio k/k by a single cut, yielding two pieces of equal value for each of these n− 1
players. The noncutter identifies either the piece to the left of the middle cut (with respect to the
interval [0,1]), or the piece to the right of the middle cut as being worth at least half of the cake
according to his or her measure, and then continues dividing this piece with those k − 1 cutters
whose cuts fall within this piece. The other piece will be divided among the k remaining cutters.
That is, a new round is started in which those two pieces of C are divided among k players each,
simultaneously but independently of each other.
If there is an odd number of players, say n = 2k+1, all players but one divide cake C in the ratio
k/(k+1) by a single cut. The noncutter identifies either the piece to the left of the kth cut as being
worth at least k/(2k+1), or the piece to the right of the kth cut as being worth at least (k+1)/(2k+1).
Accordingly, the noncutter continues dividing either the piece to the left of the kth cut with those
k− 1 cutters whose cuts fall within this piece, or the noncutter divides the piece to the right of the
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kth cut with those k cutters whose cuts fall within this piece. In both cases, the other piece will be
divided among all the remaining cutters.
In this way, the procedure is applied recursively until just one player remains in each
subprocedure, i.e., until all the cake has been allocated to the players. Note that in the case of
n = 2, this is just the simple cut-and-choose protocol.
Brams, Jones, and Klamler [BJK07] present a finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol
that is based on a divide-and-conquer strategy, and focuses on minimizing the number of players the
most-envious player may envy. The major difference to the protocol described above lies in the way
of splitting the piece of a particular subprocedure into two subpieces. While the original Divide and
Conquer protocol suggests to use one of the cuts made by the cutters, the Minimal-Envy Divide and
Conquer protocol suggests to conduct one more cut strictly between the cut chosen by the Divide
and Conquer protocol and the very next right neighboring cut (according to the interval [0,1]), and
then to use this additional cut for splitting the particular piece of the cake into two subpieces for the
following round if there is any (or to be assigned if this has been the final round).
Lemma 5.5 The Divide and Conquer protocol and the Minimal-Envy Divide and Conquer protocol
both have a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of n · ⌊logn⌋+2n−2⌊logn⌋+1.
Proof. The Divide and Conquer protocol is recursively defined. Put simply, in each subprocedure
the given subpart of the cake is divided into two pieces and so are the players into two groups, the
procedure then is applied recursively again and again to the resulting pieces and related players
until in each subprocedure just one player remains. In each round, every player participating in
any of the subprocedures of this round will not envy at least one of the players continuing with the
corresponding other piece, as this other piece is of no more value (according to his or her measure)
than the one he or she is continuing with. Thus, in each round, for each player involved in this round,
one envy-free-relation is guaranteed to exist. Note that, for each subprocedure in any round except
the final one, the numbers of players to be continued with in the resulting two subprocedures of the
following round depend on whether the total number of players involved in the given subprocedure
is even or odd.
From these remarks it follows that the Divide and Conquer protocol’s degree of guaranteed
envy-freeness, call it d(n) for n players, can be described by the following recurrence:
d(1) = 0,
d(n) = d(k)+d(k)+2k for n = 2k,
d(n) = d(k)+d(k+1)+2k+1 for n = 2k+1.
Apparently, this recurrence relation can be simplified to:
d(1) = 0,
d(n) = d(⌊n/2⌋)+d(⌈n/2⌉)+n for n ≥ 2. (5.a)
The recurrence in (5.a) and similar versions are well known to occur also in other contexts.19 It
19For example, they also occur in the context of evaluating the number of comparisons made by various sorting
algorithms that are based on a divide-and-conquer strategy. In particular, this recurrence expresses the number of
comparisons done by the standard merge-sort algorithm.
29
is a matter of routine (see, e.g., [GKP94]) to solve it (i.e., to bring it into closed form):
d(n) = n · ⌊logn⌋+2n−2⌊log n⌋+1 for n ≥ 1. (5.b)
How does Equation (5.b) reflect the guaranteed number of envy-free-relations of the Divide and
Conquer protocol? As mentioned before, this protocol can be considered as a collection of several
subprocedures that altogether yield a proportional division of the given cake. This collection of
subprocedures can be represented as a balanced binary tree (called the “recursion tree”), because
in every subprocedure the given subpart of the cake is cut into two pieces for which the procedure
is applied recursively again and again until just one player remains in each resulting subprocedure.
Since the depth of a balanced binary tree is logarithmic in the number of leaves, ⌈logn⌉ rounds are
performed in total. If the number n of players is not a power of two, every round except for the last
one (i.e., ⌊logn⌋ rounds) is represented by a completely filled level of the binary tree in terms of the
number of players, since all n players are participating in these rounds—in different subprocedures
though. Note that n is a power of two if and only if it holds that ⌈logn⌉ = ⌊logn⌋ (i.e., the final
round is numbered ⌊log n⌋), and only in this case, all n players are involved in each of the rounds,
even in the final round.
Recall that, in each round, every participating player will not envy at least one of the players
continuing with the particular other piece, since he or she considers this piece to be of no more
value than the one he or she is continuing with, i.e., in each round one guaranteed envy-free-relation
is created on behalf of each of the participating players. For this reason, n envy-free-relations
are guaranteed to be created in each of the first ⌊log n⌋ rounds. This is because in subsequent
rounds the particular subparts to be divided will never get bigger again, and once two players have
ended up in different subprocedures, they will never meet again in the same subprocedure of any
of the following rounds. Moreover, once a player has ended up in some group, he or she will
not make future evaluations of pieces of the cake to be divided among the players in the other
group. Thus, those envy-free-relations that result from any of the first ⌊log n⌋ rounds are guaranteed
to persist until all the cake has been allocated. However, it cannot be determined which of the
players continuing with the other piece of the particular subpart is not envied, since no evaluations
of the pieces created in other subprocedures are made. In accordance with the proof of Lemma 3.4,
the latter also justifies why no more envy-free-relations can be guaranteed. Hence, it can just be
guaranteed that each player does not envy at least one of the players continuing with the other
piece. Summing up, as exactly n guaranteed envy-free-relations are created in each of the first
⌊log n⌋ rounds, n · ⌊logn⌋ guaranteed envy-free-relations are created over all rounds, except for the
final round if n is not a power of two. Note that if n is a power of two, the (log n)th round is the final
round and Equation (5.b) simplifies to d(n) = n · logn, so in this case we are done.
In contrast, if n is not a power of two then less than n players will be involved in the final
round (i.e., in the round numbered ⌈log n⌉ = ⌊log n⌋+ 1), since in that case there is at least one
subprocedure that involves an odd number of players. More specifically, in this case the number
of players involved in the final round can be expressed by the term 2n− 2⌊log n⌋+1, where 2⌊logn⌋+1
specifies the number of players that would be involved in the final round if the binary recursion tree
would be a full binary tree, i.e., if all n players would be involved in the final round.
In order to analyze the final round for n not being a power of two in detail, let i-subprocedure
denote a subprocedure involving exactly i players. A 3-subprocedure can occur only in the second-
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to-last round, and if it occurs then one of its three players cannot be participating in the final round,
i.e., only two out of three players are proceeding to the final round. Since in a balanced binary
tree the depth of all leaves differs by at most one, the second-to-last round can have only either
2-subprocedures and/or 3-subprocedures, or 4-subprocedures and/or 3-subprocedures. Regarding a
second-to-last round with at least one 3-subprocedure and any number of 2-subprocedures (which
can happen only if n is not a power of two), the number of players involved in the final round
will be twice the number of 3-subprocedures occurring in the second-to-last round. Regarding a
second-to-last round with at least one 3-subprocedure and any number of 4-subprocedures (which
again can happen only if n is not a power of two), the number of players involved in the final
round will be twice the number of 3-subprocedures plus four times the number of 4-subprocedures.
Consequently, the number of 3-subprocedures and the number of 4-subprocedures in the second-to-
last round determine how many players are participating in the final round, and thus also determine
the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations to be created in the final round.
If n is not a power of two, analogously to the argument for the first ⌊logn⌋ rounds, also in the
final round one guaranteed envy-free-relation is created with respect to each participating player.
Thus, for any number n ≥ 1 of players, at least 2n− 2⌊logn⌋+1 guaranteed envy-free-relations are
created in the (⌊log n⌋+ 1)th round.20 According to the proof of Lemma 3.4, no more than that
many envy-free-relations can be guaranteed. Altogether, this sums up to n · ⌊logn⌋+2n−2⌊logn⌋+1
guaranteed envy-free-relations in total, which is the number stated in Equation (5.b).
The degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of the Minimal-Envy Divide and Conquer protocol
can be shown just as for the original Divide and Conquer protocol. The difference in the way of
splitting the particular piece of the cake into two subpieces does not affect the number of guaranteed
envy-free-relations. Consequently, although the Minimal-Envy Divide and Conquer protocol does
decrease envy according to the definition of Brams, Jones, and Klamler [BJK07] (see Section 6 for
more discussion of this point), its DGEF is n · ⌊logn⌋+2n−2⌊logn⌋+1, just as for the original Divide
and Conquer protocol. ❑
5.6 Recursive Divide and Choose
This protocol has been presented by Tasna´di [Tas03] and describes a recursive procedure for how
to always achieve a proportional division. It works as follows: In the case of n = 2, this is just
the simple cut-and-choose protocol. In the case of n = 3, one of the players, the “divider,” divides
the cake into three equal pieces according to his or her measure, and each of the two other players,
the “choosers,” marks two pieces he or she considers to be worth the most, where ties may be
broken arbitrarily. If both choosers marked the same two pieces, they divide these by applying
the simple cut-and-choose protocol, and the divider receives the remaining piece. If the choosers
marked different pieces, they divide the piece they both have marked via the simple cut-and-choose
protocol, and each of the choosers divides the piece marked by just him- or herself with the divider,
again via applying the simple cut-and-choose protocol.
In the case of n > 3 players, this procedure is repeated recursively until all comes down to the
simple cut-and-choose protocol involving two players only. In more detail, in the first round the
20Note that n is a power of two if and only if 2n−2⌊logn⌋+1 = 0, and that in this case there is no (⌊logn⌋+1)th round.
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divider cuts the cake into n equal pieces according to his or her measure, and each of the n− 1
choosers marks n− 1 pieces he or she considers to be worth the most, where ties may be broken
arbitrarily. Afterwards, a new round is started and each of the n pieces is divided among those n−1
choosers that identified this piece as being acceptable. Concerning pieces that have been marked
by less than n− 1 choosers, the divider fills out these empty slots by an appropriate number of
clones. In other words, each of the n pieces enters the next round of the protocol and induces a
new subprocedure in the scope of which the particular piece is being divided among n−1 players.
All n subprocedures are executed simultaneously but independently of each other. Note that if in
the very first round all n−1 choosers marked the same n−1 pieces as being acceptable than there
is exactly one piece that has not been marked by any of the choosers. In this case, this piece is
directly assigned to the divider and the divider drops out, whereas all choosers enter the next round
for dividing the n−1 remaining pieces among them.
Analogously, in the kth round, 1 < k < n, there are ∏ki=2 (n− i+2) subprocedures, i.e.,
∏ki=2 (n− i+2) pieces are to be divided simultaneously but independently among n− k+1 players
each. In every subprocedure any one player is determined to be the divider and cuts the particular
piece of this subprocedure into n − k + 1 equal subpieces according to his or her measure.
Afterwards, each of the n− k choosers of this particular subprocedure marks n− k pieces he or she
considers to be worth the most, where ties may be broken arbitrarily. Each of the n− k+ 1 pieces
will induce a new subprocedure in the next round and will be divided among those n−k players that
marked this piece as being acceptable—where the divider fills out all empty slots regarding pieces
that have been marked by less than n− k choosers. Again, if in some round k, 1 < k < n, in any of
the subprocedures, all n− k choosers agree on the same n− k pieces, then there will be exactly one
piece that has not been marked by any of the choosers. In this case, the unmarked piece is directly
assigned to the divider of this particular subprocedure, and in the following rounds, the divider will
not be involved in any of the subprocedures that results from this one, i.e., only n− k pieces enter
the next round, in which these are to be divided among the n− k choosers of the previous round.
Nevertheless, this divider will enter the next round and will participate in all those subprocedures
that result from procedures he has not dropped out from yet.
Applying this procedure recursively until only two players remain in each subprocedure (i.e.,
running n−1 rounds), and dividing the corresponding piece of the cake between these two via the
simple cut-and-choose protocol, the Recursive Divide and Choose protocol provides a proportional
division of the cake.
Lemma 5.6 The Recursive Divide and Choose protocol has a degree of guaranteed envy-freeness
of n.
Proof. For n ≥ 3 players, no evaluations of entire portions are made—except for the one
special case when the first-round divider drops out in the very first round (which, for the sake
of self-containment, will be considered separately below)—and thus the scenario from the proof of
Lemma 3.4 is applicable. Simply put, only n envy-free-relations can be guaranteed in every case
due to the argument in the proof of Proposition 3.3, as the missing evaluations of entire portions
allow for any valuation functions, for example, those described in the proof of Lemma 3.4. If in the
very first round all n− 1 choosers agree on the very same n− 1 pieces then the first-round divider
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will drop out with a portion that he or she values exactly 1/n and that all other players value at most
1/n. This results in n guaranteed envy-free-relations, since none of the n−1 choosers will envy the
first-round divider and the first-round divider will not envy at least one of the other players by the
argument in the proof of Proposition 3.3. However, in this case no more envy-free-relations can be
guaranteed in the following rounds due to the argument given above. Consequently, the DGEF of
the Recursive Divide and Choose protocol is n. ❑
6 Related Work and Discussion
The analysis of envy-relations dates back at least to Feldman and Kirman [FK74]. In contrast to our
approach, they consider the number of envy-pairs in already existing divisions with the intention
of maximizing fairness afterwards via trading. In particular, they do not consider the design of
cake-cutting protocols that maximize fairness. In the majority of cases, research in the area of cake-
cutting from an economic perspective is concerned more with the existence of certain divisions and
their properties than with how to achieve these divisions.
A different approach measures the intensity of envy in terms of the distance between envied
portions [Cha86].
More recently, Brams, Jones, and Klamler [BJK07] proposed to minimize envy in terms of the
maximum number of players that a player may envy. Their notion of measuring envy differs from
our notion of DGEF in various ways, the most fundamental of which is that their notion takes an
“egalitarian” approach to reducing the number of envy-relations (namely, via minimizing the most-
envious player’s envy, in terms of decreasing the number of this single player’s envy-relations). In
contrast, the DGEF aims at a “utilitarian” approach (namely, via minimizing overall envy, in terms
of increasing the total number of guaranteed envy-free-relations among all players). That is to say
that, although these notions may seem to be very similar at first glance, the approach presented
in [BJK07] is not sensitive to a reduction in the number of envy-relations on the part of any other
than the most-envious player, whereas the DGEF does take each single improvement into account
and adapts accordingly. The DGEF, thus, is a more specific, more fine-tuned measure. Note also
that Brams, Jones, and Klamler [BJK07] focus primarily on presenting a new protocol and less so
on introducing a new notion for measuring envy.
Another approach is due to Chevaleyre et al. [CEEM07], who define various metrics for the
evaluation of envy in order to classify “the degree of envy in a society,” and they use the term
“degree of envy” in the quite different setting of multiagent allocation of indivisible resources.
Besides, we stress that our approach of approximating envy-freeness differs from other lines of
research that also deal with approximating fairness. For example, Lipton et al. [LMMS04] propose
to seek for minimum-envy allocations of indivisible goods in terms of the value difference of the
utility functions of envied players, and Edmonds and Pruhs [EP06b, EP06a] approximate fairness
in cake-cutting protocols by allowing merely approximately fair pieces (in terms of their value to
the players) and by using only approximate cut queries (in terms of exactness).
It may be tempting to seek to decrease envy (and thus to increase the DGEF) via trading, aiming
to get rid of potential circular envy-relations. Although we do not consider trading to be an integral
part of a cake-cutting protocol, let us for a moment digress to briefly discuss how trading may
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potentially affect the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations.21 Indeed, if the DGEF is lower
than n(n−1)/2, the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations can be improved to this lower bound,
or to an even higher number, by resolving circular envy-relations (of which two-way envy-relations
are a special case) by means of circular trades after the execution of the protocol. Thus, in this
case, involving subsequent trading actions adds on the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations.
Furthermore, having exactly n(n−1)/2 guaranteed envy-free-relations after all circular envy-relations
have been resolved, three more guaranteed envy-free-relations can be gained by applying an envy-
free protocol (e.g., the Selfridge–Conway protocol) to the three most envied players, which yields
to an overall lower bound of 3+ n(n−1)/2 guaranteed envy-free-relations. To give an example for an
even higher impact of trading, when circular trades indeed are involved after executing either the
Divide and Conquer protocol or the Minimal-Envy Divide and Conquer protocol, their numbers of
guaranteed envy-free relations can be improved to (n(n+1)/2)−1, which follows from [BJK07].
On the other hand, if the DGEF of a proportional cake-cutting protocol is n(n−1)/2 or higher (such
as the DGEF of the protocol presented in Figure 3) then—depending on the protocol—circular envy-
relations may not be guaranteed to exist, and if such cycles are not guaranteed to exist, trading has
no impact on the number of guaranteed envy-free-relations.
However, as mentioned above, we consider trading not to be part of a cake-cutting protocol,
though it might be useful in certain cases (for example, Brams and Taylor [BT96, page 44] mention
that trading might be used “to obtain better allocations; however, this is not a procedure but an
informal adjustment mechanism”). In particular, the notion of DGEF refers to (proportional) cake-
cutting protocols without additional trading, i.e., the DGEF is defined to make a statement on the
performance of a particular protocol and not about all sorts of actions to be undertaken afterwards.
Although the well-known protocols listed in Table 1 have not been developed with a focus
on maximizing the DGEF,22 linking their degrees of guaranteed envy-freeness to the lower bound
provided by involving, e.g., the Selfridge–Conway protocol and guaranteed trading opportunities
indicates that the development of cake-cutting protocols with a considerably higher DGEF or even
with a DGEF close to the maximum of n(n−1) poses a true challenge. That is why we feel that the
enhanced DGEF of the protocol presented in Figure 3 constitutes a significant improvement.
7 Conclusions
Although different disciplines are engaged in the development of fair cake-cutting protocols for
decades now, finite bounded protocols that guarantee an envy-free division for n > 3 players are
still a mystery. However, finite bounded protocols are the ones we are looking for in terms of
practical implementations. That is why we in this paper have proposed to weaken the requirement
21To be specific here, all occurrences of “guaranteed envy-free-relations” in this and the next paragraph refer to those
envy-free-relations that are guaranteed to exist after executing some cake-cutting protocol and in addition, subsequently,
performing trades that are guaranteed to be feasible. This is in contrast with what we mean by this term anywhere else
in the paper; “guaranteed envy-free-relations” usually refers to those envy-free-relations that are guaranteed to exist after
executing the protocol only.
22Quite remarkably, without any trading actions and without involving, e.g., the Selfridge–Conway protocol the Last
Diminisher protocol achieves with its DGEF almost (being off only by one) the trading- and Selfridge–Conway-related
bound of 3+ n(n−1)/2 mentioned above.
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of envy-freeness (as much as needed and as little as possible), while insisting on finite boundedness.
To this end, we introduced the notion of degree of guaranteed envy-freeness for proportional cake-
cutting protocols. Based on this definition, we gave a survey of the DGEF in existing finite bounded
proportional cake-cutting protocols, which shows that when one is trying to approximate the ideal
of envy-freeness via the DGEF, there is quite a bit room for improvements. In particular, we expect
that the concept of DGEF is suitable to extend the scope for the development of new finite bounded
cake-cutting protocols by allowing to approximate envy-freeness step by step. In this context, we
proposed a new finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol, explicitly demonstrated for n = 4
and for arbitrary n≥ 3, which provides a significantly enhanced degree of guaranteed envy-freeness,
compared with the status quo given by the survey in Table 1 (see also Section 5). In particular,
our protocol has ⌈n/2⌉− 1 more guaranteed envy-free-relations than the Last Diminisher protocol,
which previously was the best finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol with respect to the
DGEF. To achieve this significantly enhanced DGEF, our protocol makes use of parallelization with
respect to the leftmost and the rightmost pieces. In this regard, adjusting the values of the pieces
to be marked from 1/n to 1/s (with s players still in the game) and applying an appropriate inner-
loop procedure is crucial to make the parallelization work. In addition to an enhanced DGEF, our
protocol still has the other useful properties the Last Diminisher protocol is known to possess, such
as strategy-proofness.
In general, we suggest to target improvements on the “level of envy-freeness” already in the
design of cake-cutting protocols rather than trying to improve on the number of envy-free-relations
afterwards for the division obtained (e.g., via trading [FK74, Cha86]). In terms of future research,
this approach encourages to develop new protocols with even higher degrees of guaranteed envy-
freeness—one may even think of modifications that focus on the development of protocols with
“balanced envy-freeness” while keeping the DGEF high.
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